Mere promises or...
The News on Sunday
August 17, 2008
Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri

The recent demand by the Kashmiris of Srinagar to open a trade route along the Line of Control (LoC) gave a new twist to the decades’ old conflict between Pakistan and India. The situation emerged after fruit growers from Indian Kashmir, instead of demanding right to self-determination, called for a trade corridor across the LoC to sell their perishable fruits to the people of Pakistani Kashmir. The demand was aimed at doing away with the problems they were facing in sending their produce to the rest of India, due to an economic blockage by agitators in Jammu over a land allocation dispute. Their call for a march to the LoC had the support of Kashmir’s Chamber of Commerce, as well as the two main political parties. Despite a curfew, thousands of people gathered and the police had to resort to firing at them to stop the march, which resulted in the death of 22 people.

All this happened despite the fact that both Pakistan and India, as members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), have reaffirmed repeatedly their commitment to promoting regional cooperation as well as intra-regional trade. During their bilateral meetings, the two countries have already discussed the possibility of allowing trade across the LoC. After all, if they can trade across the Wagha border, then why resist the same across the LoC?

In fact, the last week’s incidents in Indian Kashmir testify to the fact that SAARC has failed yet again. The association might not have been able to eradicate the root cause of the problem that led to the death of 22 people. However, a functional SAARC could have led to enhanced regional cooperation as well as intra-regional trade, thus providing the producers and farmers with an opportunity to sell their products in others markets in the region too.

It seems that member countries of the SAARC are not serious in taking the association’s agenda forward. One can assess the level of their engagement from the fact that during the last 23 years of SAARC’s existence, only 15 annual summits have been held, while eight annual summits could not be held due to the non-serious attitude of the member countries. One of the major achievements of SAARC, at least on paper, has been the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA), which was signed in 2004. Despite this free trade agreement, regional trade in South Asia is still less than five percent of the total trade volume of its member countries.

Why SAFTA is not giving a push to intra-regional trade? There are many reasons for this; however, one of the major ones is that despite this free trade agreement only selected products through selected ports of entry are being traded in South Asia. The trade within SAARC region is based on ‘negative lists’ (lists of ‘sensitive products’ for which tariff would not be reduced). The trade between Pakistan and India is carried out under a special arrangement — on the basis of a ‘positive list’.

Only the products included in the ‘positive list’ of Pakistan can be traded with India. The restrictions and curbs on tradable commodities are part of almost all major free trade agreements, so that the trading countries can protect their ‘sensitive products’ from the negative effects of liberalisation. However, blocking the natural trading routes not only increases the cost of doing business, but also the miseries of both producers and consumers.

One expected that SAARC would take care of most of the intra-regional issues. However, the Colombo Declaration issued at the conclusion of the recently held XV SAARC Summit was as disappointing for many South Asians as were the previous 14 declarations. “Partnership for growth for our people” was the central theme of the Colombo Declaration and it emphasises a lot on “robust partnership for people-centric development”. However, many feel, that much of what was agreed in Colombo had nothing to do either with “partnership” or with “people-centric development”.

Like previous summits, the heads of state / government once again reaffirmed their commitment to the principles and objectives enshrined in the SAARC Charter. They renewed their resolve for collective regional efforts to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development, which would promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and improve their quality of life, thereby contributing to peace, stability, amity and progress in the region. They also talked of “effective implementation of all SAARC programmes and mechanisms by rationalisation and performance evaluation on a regular basis”.

The XV SAARC declaration does talk about the need for developing the regional hydro potential, grid connectivity and gas pipelines to meet the growing energy requirements; improving communication among member countries by lowering telecommunication tariffs; improving intra-regional connectivity; promoting tourism; increasing regional trade; cooperating to combat challenges of climate change; conserving water resources; working together for poverty alleviation; initiating joint ventures to combat terrorism; and mutual cooperation for education as well as trade in services.

All these are excellent commitments. In fact, this is the minimum that the people of SAARC region deserve. After all, most of the challenges facing the region are common and can be effectively tackled only through collective regional responses. However, in the absence of any timeframe or clear direction, declarations issued at the conclusion of annual SAARC summits cannot help in devising meaningful regional strategies for sustainable development.

There are certain fundamental issues that need to be addressed for turning SAARC into an effective body for regional cooperation. Non-proliferation and demilitarisation are a must for people-centric development in South Asia. How can South Asian countries contribute to peace, stability and development when they are busy in a maddening arms race? How can they afford to spend on people’s welfare when more than one third of their financial resources are allocated to defence? How can they talk of joint efforts to combat terrorism when their intelligence agencies are making plans to destabilise the neighbouring countries? How can they talk of conserving water resources when Pakistan and India, the two biggest countries in the region, are directly responsible for the melting and receding of Himalayan glaciers? In fact, many of the problems facing the region can be solved simply by demilitarisation.

The second core issue hampering any progress towards realising the objectives of SAARC is the draconian visa regime. SAARC heads of state / government are talking of promoting trade in services, tourism, cultural cooperation, education, etc. Who can disagree with the wisdom of SAARC leaders on this issue? However, a soft visa regime is a must to achieve these objectives. How can one think of promoting trade in services, tourism, cultural cooperation and education with the existing visa problems, especially between Pakistan and India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and Bangladesh and India?

While Sri Lanka and Nepal follow a policy of issuing visas on arrival to South Asian visitors, the visa regime between two Pakistan and India is a nightmare. General visas are issued (if at all) for a maximum of three cities. There are restrictions on mode of travel, and ports of entry and departure. Moreover, the visitors are bound to report to the local police station at their destination about their whereabouts. Furthermore, there are requirements of filling residential permit forms and carrying immigration forms in the host country. None of these practices would help in promoting intra-region tourism.

Cooperation in promoting education is another area that requires immediate attention of policymakers. Policy measures — such as mutual recognition of educational qualifications, issuance of student visas, provision of more scholarships for intra-regional students and, most importantly, revising the curricula to ensure that textbooks do not promote enemy image of the next door neighbours — are a must to devise a common strategy for cooperation in promoting education across the South Asian region.

The XV SAARC Summit has rightly recognised that improving intra-regional connectivity is another prerequisite for regional integration. However, it seems a wishful thinking considering that direct flights do not operate even among all SAARC capitals. For example, there is no direct flight from Islamabad to any other SAARC capital, except Kabul. Therefore, it is cheaper to fly from Islamabad to a European destination than to Kathmandu or Colombo. There is no provision of international roaming service between Pakistan and India, and Pakistan and Nepal. It is five to 10 times cheaper to make a call to the United States, the United Kingdom or Canada from South Asia than to make an intra-regional call. The first and foremost issue, however, is improved connectivity of the region’s decision-makers, so that they may in turn improve intra-regional connectivity.

SAARC heads of state / government have quite rightly identified that there must be enhanced intra-regional cooperation to tackle the challenges of climate change, energy shortage and food security. However, these challenges require concrete responses from the member countries. A clear roadmap, sharing of resources and responsibilities, and working with a ‘win-win’ paradigm is required to collectively deliver on these challenges. The ideas of SAARC food bank, development fund and commission on climate change are still in the air, and waiting ratification from the member countries.

SAARC heads of state / government rightly condemned all forms of terrorist violence, and expressed serious concern over the serious threats posed by terrorism to the peace, stability and security of the region. They reiterated their commitment to strengthening the legal regime against terrorism, including by undertaking to implement all international conventions relating to combatting terrorism to which the member countries are parties, as well as the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and the Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.

However, it must be understood that a joint approach to combat terrorism requires common understanding of possible root causes of this phenomenon. One needs to understand the crucial linkages between terrorism and poverty, terrorism and lack of democracy, terrorism and social injustice, terrorism and growing militarisation in society and, finally, terrorism and intolerance. If global North can enter in intercultural and interfaith dialogues to understand the possible causes of growing extremism and intolerance leading to violence, then what stops the stakeholders in this region from making an attempt to understand the point of view of their neighbours vis-a-vis terrorism through constructive debate and dialogue. An understanding of how conflicts happen would provide the clues needed for avoiding and managing terrorism.

SAARC is gaining international recognition. Currently, Australia, China, the European Union, Iran, Japan, Korea, Mauritius, Myanmar and the US are observers to the association. However, it is quite disappointing to note that broader civil society (not merely NGOs) do not find any voice in this process at all. Concerned citizens of South Asia, including academicians, advocacy groups, development practitioners, lawyers, journalists peace activists, the private sector, rights activist, women’s groups, youth groups, and many other non-governmental actors have been very actively playing their role in turning the dream of regional cooperation into a reality.

People’s initiatives seek to sensitise member countries of SAARC on the urgency of regional cooperation in all potential forms and in all possible ways, and urge them to act quickly so that South Asians do not continue to suffer. They are mindful of the fact that awareness raising among the people of the region, to generate pressure on the policymaking processes and structures, is the ultimate trump card to bring about the desired changes, if the governments and SAARC do not act.

Despite Pakistan’s significant contribution to and sacrifices in the fight against extremism, the debate on its role in the US-led global ‘war on terror’ is still on and is stirring mixed responses. Most of the time of Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani during his recent visit to the United States was spent in explaining and clarifying Pakistan’s role in this war, though he failed to allay completely US apprehensions in this regard. The external pressure on Pakistan for results-based performance in the ‘war on terror’ is only expected to mount in the coming days.

The tribal areas will again be the main arena of international focus in this regard. Similarly, America’s future course of action will depend on the results of Pakistan’s ‘war on terror’ policies, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It remains to be seen whether Islamabad, or more specifically Rawalpindi where the GHQ is located, will be able to adopt corrective policies to check the ever-increasing militancy and avert the much-publicised impending US direct action against militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas or not.

Is there a need for revising our policy in the tribal areas and Afghanistan? Is any balanced policy option available to us? Is our policy formulated after assessing all the pros and cons, and after taking into account the genuine strategic interests of all the stakeholders, both internal and external? These are some of the main questions analysts have been trying to answer after the prime minister’s recent visit to the US.

America’s frustration at Pakistan’s failure to counter the terrorist threats to its strategic interests and to close militants’ safe havens in the tribal areas is becoming more and more visible with each passing day. Earlier, America was pressing hard for the resumption of the joint US-Pakistani operations that ended in 2003, but Pakistan rejected this demand and asked for more US military assistance and intelligence cooperation to deal with the militants by itself.

Now the US has asked Pakistan “to do more” or it will take the things into its hands. To put pressure on Pakistan, the US is threatening direct action against the militants and their bases in Pakistan’s tribal areas, where they get training to plan and conduct cross-border attacks on US and NATO troops. The growing activities of the militants on the Pakistani soil and some of the recent statements by them are lending credence to the allegation that the country is being used by them to plan attacks against other countries.

Using its bases in Afghanistan, the coalition forces are already chasing the local and non-Afghan militants into Pakistan’s border areas, besides targeting the suspected militants’ hideouts and high-value targets by air. Reconnaissance flights by US spy planes and drones over Pakistan’s tribal areas have become a routine occurrence. Amid a record surge in the Taliban’s attacks, mounting causalities of the US and NATO forces, and an increase in the number of non-Afghan volunteers who are fighting along with the Taliban in Afghanistan, Washington’s concerns do not appear to be baseless.

Pointing finger at the Taliban and citing al-Qaeda’s latest activities, US officials are also foreseeing the possibility of another 9/11-like incident, which could originate from Pakistan’s tribal areas. Sharing US apprehensions, Gilani recently maintained that incidents like 9/11 could happen again if foreign militants were not dealt with sternly. He admitted that foreign militants — including the Chechens, Uzbeks and Tajiks — were present in the tribal areas and their activities were increasing with each passing day.

The ties between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) currently are at the lowest ebb, though the two have remained close allies for decades. Since the 1980s, the CIA — in close collaboration with its Pakistani counterpart — has first instigated and supported jihad against the Soviet invasion, and then conducted counter-insurgency operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda after 9/11. The latter operations, however, have caused a major dent in their ties.

American military and intelligence officials suspect that some of the pro-Taliban elements in the ISI have links with and support the militants who are undermining US strategic interests in the region. Due to strategic imperatives, they believe, Pakistan joined the so-called ‘war on terror’, but its spy agency continued its policy of engagement with the Taliban. Some powerful circles in Pakistan consider the militants as one of the main policy tools for achieving strategic depth in Afghanistan. They want to install a government of their choice in the country, to keep the current unfriendly Afghan government under constant pressure, as well as to counter India’s growing political and diplomatic moves there.

Instead of removing the mistrust between the CIA and the ISI, the recent high-level talks between American and Pakistani military and intelligence officials ended in a fiasco, with allegations and counter-allegations being traded against each other. For example, Pakistan was critical of the US for disregarding foreign support to the Baloch resistance movement. It claimed that the CIA dossier on the ISI was based on “India-influenced intelligence inputs”. Privately, some of Pakistan’s security officials did not hide their concerns about the alleged US-India-Afghanistan nexus aimed at destabilising Pakistan.

Pakistan is also disturbed by the emerging links between the US and India. To the country’s utter disappointment, the recently-released National Defense Strategy document of the Pentagon envisions a greater role for India in the international system, corresponding to its “growing economic, military and soft power”. Islamabad is also complaining that, despite repeated requests, the US did not provide it the required equipment to effectively control and secure the border for checking the illegal cross-border movement.

On the other hand, American and Afghan officials are complaining about the ISI’s deliberate attempts to undermine their strategic interests by supporting the Taliban. US think-tanks, as well as its strategic and intelligence communities, have started blaming directly some elements in the ISI for supporting the militants and having links with them. It has also charged some elements in the ISI for providing the militants with details about the American campaign against them.
This is the prime reason that the US is now urging Pakistan to do something about the alleged involvement of ISI officials with the militants. Unlike the past, when the Americans used to keep mum over Afghan and Indian allegations against Pakistan, the CIA has blamed the ISI for the July 7 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, while referring to communication intercepts between Pakistani intelligence officers and the militants who allegedly carried out this attack.

The leakage of highly confidential documents to the media and the validation of Indian allegations by the CIA are a cause of displeasure for the Pakistani policymakers. Pakistan strongly rejects these allegations and terms the reports of its intelligence officers’ links with the militants and their role in bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul baseless. If the US pressure prevails upon the Pakistani rulers, a purge in the ISI is expected soon. According to some analysts, this would be the fourth purge since the late 1980s to clear the ISI of pro-militants elements.

The US government is facing problems in coping with the new political realities that emerged after the February 18 general elections in Pakistan. The events that took place prior to and around Gilani’s visit to the US, especially the ISI fiasco, overshadowed it. This has further exposed the government’s lack of direction and political will, as well as its indecisiveness and ineptness. The policy of political engagement with the militants has failed to find any subscribers in the West, mainly due to its dubious nature. These deals have failed to contain militancy, establish the government’s writ and rule of law, and put an end to cross-border infiltration. The western countries want a results-based policy, not just a deal for the sake of a deal.
Amid unprecedented pressure to do more in the ‘war on terror’, Islamabad is left with very few options. Even if the Bush-Gilani meeting was “between a remote-control prime minister and a lame-duck president”, its outcomes will have far reaching impact on the ties between Pakistan and the US on the one hand, and on Pakistan’s domestic politics on the other hand. Considering this, will the Washington again prefer the military leadership over civilians for doing serious business? In this scenario, what will be the emerging equation of civil-military relations? Is the Bangladeshi model applicable to Pakistan, where several clean-up experiments and accountability drives have repeatedly failed due to partiality, lack of transparency and selectiveness? Will only Musharraf’s ouster really bring about the desired changes? It will not take long to find answers to these questions.

Pakistan is among those countries, which is vulnerable and prone to disasters, particularly natural disaster. Seasonal flood has the most recurrence nature that hit the plain areas, almost every year, which results in huge loss to human lives, livelihood and national economy.

According to Federal Flood Commission, since 1950 to 2006 loss of lives due to flood is 7220, while the damages to property are worth 385,821 million since 1950 to 2004.

The recent flood in Peshawar provides a good case study to estimate the losses and suffering of the affectees and gauge the state of preparedness of our government. According to the preliminary statistics released to the media by Nazim of Peshawar, the flood has killed 15000 livestock, razed 12000 houses, which rendered 200,000 people homeless approximately. The approximate loss to infrastructure was raised to the tune of five billion Rupees. World Health Organization warned against the outbreak of epidemics in the flood hit areas that will further spiral the suffering of the affectees.

The Nazim, while addressing a press conference, contested the existence of any Crisis Management Cell in the province and deplored that everything was in files. He also suggested to the NWFP government to set up a disaster management authority and equip it with all kinds of instruments and machinery,. Albeit, the flood has a recurrent nature, but every time it looks like that the government is facing a new phenomenon with a painful confusion and panic to deal the situation sane proper preparedness and skill.

The government of Pakistan formulated various policies and legislative measures from time to time to respond effectively in such situation. But unfortunately, after sixty years down the line, our institution neither learnt any lesson nor can lay a claim to any experts in the field.

Till 2005, the government policy of disaster management was revolving around flood fighting and had established Emergency Relief Cell and Federal Flood commission to formulate response strategies. In 2005 Pakistan became signatory to the Hyogo Protocol, which envisages a holistic approach toward disaster management and lay downs some internationally accepted standards for disaster management: Preparedness; Response and Rehabilitation. The Hyogo Framework of Action expects at the end of ten years period “the substantial reduction of disaster losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries”.

Following these standards government of Pakistan, while keeping in view the experiences of October 2005 Earthquake, formulated National Disaster Management Framework (NDMF), which covers natural as well as anthropogenic disasters and also out line priority areas like: National hazards and vulnerability assessment, multi hazard early warning system, institutional arrangements for risk reduction and response, promoting disaster preparedness planning, community and local level risk reduction programming, training education and awareness, main streaming disaster risk reduction into development, emergency response system and capacity development for post disaster recovery.

To achieve these goals and objectives, in October 2006, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) was created, which envisaged an organizational structure on provincial as well as on Districts level. But after two years of its establishment, the priorities laid down in the Framework are still confining to the files of the authority.

Though, the Framework is a well written and articulated document, which exists on federal level, but failed to implement and materialized i at the district level as yet, though the ultimate responsibility of implementation of such policies falls on the shoulders of local district administrations. Perhaps large majority of the district official may not even know about the existence of the document.

Ironically, the district administrations neither have the capacity and resources nor responsive attitude toward such policy change. In the second and third weeks of June, which is the crucial time for preparedness, the writer visited six disaster prone districts: Badin; Bagh; Battagram; Mansehra; Noshki and Shahdadkot in connection of SDPI’s disaster management study, but surprisingly nowhere witnessed a sort of disaster preparation at the district level, particularly in flood prone districts. During the course of field survey, a responsible District Executive Officer in Badin disclosed in an interview that out of 20 ambulances, 18 are out of order. This exposes the limits of disaster preparedness in high-risk area.

Practically, disaster management is still confining to rescue and relief, treated by the district administrations in the traditional way, mostly following the strategies formulated in the sixties. As yet, the civilian administration could not build up its own capacity and is heavily reliant on military, particularly for rescue and relief operation. The Civil Defense Department, particularly in rural districts exists in a bad shape mostly with empty offices. The National Disaster Framework provides for arranging trainings for the officials, but the idea has never been materialized at least in the six districts visited by this scribe.

Often in time of disaster, the district administration comes into action without a proper institutional coordination, which renders the whole exercise directionless and ineffective. As SDPI’s recent study on disaster management says,’there is no mention in the entire document of the logistics – who would take care in case of disaster’.

Furthermore, the NDMF document neither fix responsibilities on the local level nor provides for the allocation of required resources. As the District Revenue Officer in a flood hit district maintained that during the flood of 2007, the district administration requested NGOs working in the district to come forward for the relief of flood affectees, as the district administration lack the resources to arrange the relief goods. The government relief operation is not amenable to transparence, due to corruption, misuse of relief goods and nepotism.

Conversely, rehabilitation is one of the gigantic and pain staking task in any post-disaster period. In practice, the disaster management in Pakistan is still bias in this regard. As SDPI study argues that’ the NDMF’s main emphasis is on the rescue and relief and the document does not elaborate on the rehabilitation procedures’. The government initiatives, if any, regarding rehabilitation bear biases toward the masses. Primarily, the government focus remains on the restoration of strategically important infrastructure rather than the rehabilitation of livelihood of the affectees, which increases the incidences of poverty in post disaster period.

The NDMF reiterates to establish a multi hazard early warning system, but so far the Meteorological Department has no institutional link or proper channel with district administration to provide timely information about the predictable hazards or disaster like torrential rains, floods and cyclones. Majority of the district officials interviewed revealed that they usually get such information through media. It seems that MD and Flood Monitoring Cell either lack or do not have the capability to forecast accurately about the magnitude of the flood and the areas that might be hit by the flood or resort to negligence.

Keeping in view the vulnerability of the country to various types of disasters, particularly the seasonal floods with a recurrent nature, the government focus should more on preparedness. Every year, flood takes its toll on human lives as well as on national economy, but the policies still lack the spirit of due implementation. The responsible authorities do nothing unless the disaster hit, such attitude toward the problem is bound to end up in chaos and increasing loss.

The NDMF should clearly define role and responsibilities of various departments and authorities at the district level with better institutional coordination.

The months of May and June should be declared as preparedness period with the high alert notification to all concerned departments and municipal organizations. NDMA should also arrange necessary trainings for the local authorities to build their capacity to cope with the situation properly.

What is in stock for Pakistan?
World Tribune Pakistan
By Talimand Khan
02-Aug-2008

Once again Pakistan is passing through a critical phase of its history. Today we have more enemies than friends, thanks to our ‘security state’ concept and penchant to be a front line state in the wars of others. We remained partner in various western military alliances and procured sophisticated weaponry but could not protect our country from dismemberment. We built nuclear bombs and missiles to secure the country’s integrity, but instead of its guarantying our sovereignty, today the nation is worried about the security of its
nuclear assets, as the international community, particularly the west are openly expressing their so-called apprehensions that our nuclear assets may fall in some unsafe hands. In fact Pakistan became a training ground for all and sundry, without an iota of respect for its sovereignty and integrity.

No doubt Pakistan remains the major recipient of western aid, but the dollars poured in, can not alleviate the poverty, have gone either in the dark tunnel of defense or in a few pockets.

The concept of security state has multiplied Pakistan’s political and economic problems: the out growth of security institutions; dilution of democracy; erosion of civilian institutions; controlled judiciary and the diversion of national resources to defense from social sector.
It is time for introspection to ask some questions that whether our foreign policy and security paradigms are is representing the national aspirations based on ground realties, or is the by-product of certain mentality? Have we acquired the power to promote their vested interests in the name of national interests.

To come out of this rut, the elected representatives need to address the issues and the root causes of present predicament at the policy level, as any cosmetic remedy or superficial attempt may further jeopardize the future of democracy, which perhaps the country may sustain.

Pakistan should mend fences with the neighboring countries, particularly with India and Afghanistan on the principles of peaceful co-existence and mutual respect. The hostility took heavily its toll on the country’s economy and political stability. Therefore, all the disputes with these neighboring states should be solved through peaceful diplomatic means.

So far, the dispute with Afghanistan is concern, Pakistan should abandon the policy to convert Afghanistan into a satellite state and seek for a durable and mutually acceptable solution with a stable Afghanistan through diplomatic means. Instead of interference in Afghanistan, Pakistan should bring the FATA in the main stream by incorporating it in the province of khtoonkhwa with provincial autonomy to eliminate the so-called breeding ground of militancy.