BRI vs B3W: Where does Pakistan Stand?
Duaa E Zahra Shah, Syed Shujaat Ahmed and Hina Aslam

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Abstract

Economic corridor is the key to trade and regional integration, which is economically and politically beneficial for the partnering within the corridor. Build Back Better World (B3W) brings in another opportunity for Pakistan but with caution, as political disconnect between China and G7 countries may cause challenges for Pakistan. This study discusses in detail the importance of both BRI and B3W for Pakistan by holding a Focus Group Discussion in the context of SDG-5, SDG-8, SDG-9, and SDG-10. The study finds that BRI, already operational in 140 countries, is more inclusive with expert technology and infrastructure excess has wider scope currently whereas B3W has theoretical importance in terms of soft outcome as it is yet to be there. Based on the findings, integration between BRI and B3W is recommended for better outcomes in developing countries.
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Introduction
A heated debate on Build Back Better World (B3W) vs Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is going on in the world. Some people believe that B3W is purely a reaction to counter BRI. This notion is further strengthened when perceived in the light of B3W factsheet, which states that G7 gathered to “discuss strategic competition with China (White House 2021)”. This study aims to explore the similarities, dissimilarities, and complementarities of both the initiatives to generate discussion in Pakistan and how does it navigate itself in the current scenario.

The need for this study arises from Pakistan’s position being at the crossroads. B3W seems to counter BRI, of which Pakistan is a part of through CPEC, but the two initiatives differ in strengths and weaknesses. They can together meet Pakistan’s rapidly expanding infrastructure and development needs. In this perspective, this study aims to outline the key features of B3W, BRI, and CPEC and presents a comparative analysis of the two to make informed policy recommendations for Pakistan.

Build Back Better World (B3W)
Launched in June 2021 by the Group of Seven (G7), Build Back Better World (B3W) is a global programme to respond to the development gaps in low and middle-income countries as well as developing countries’ $40+ trillion infrastructure requirement.

G7 countries and other invited democracies will organize market-driven private sector capital and make investments by the development finance institutions towards climate, health and health security, digital technology and gender equity and equality. The United States, in particular, plans to incorporate the standards of multilateral development banks and international financial institutions and enhance private and public capital mobilization for sustainable infrastructure investment. The US will also mobilize the Development Finance Corporation, USAID, EXIM, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the US Trade and Development Agency and the Transaction Advisory Fund to create opportunities abroad (White House 2021).

B3W is the product of two previous American government initiatives, i.e. the United States Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) and the Blue Dot Initiative. USICA aimed to counter Chinese influence by expanding the federal government role, directing taxpayers’ money towards US technology, increasing public investment, trade, and lending abroad, particularly in Latin America, the Caribbean, Taiwan, Africa, and Southeast Asia and restricting the flow of Chinese goods and services. The Blue Dot Initiative is Biden’s attempt to undermine China’s technological advancement and international influence (Naureen & Waqar 2021). In the Blue Dot Network, the US worked with Japan and Australia to promote high quality private sector investments. The invitations are more widespread under B3W; India, South Korea, and South Africa are also expected to join (Wheeler 2021). China responded harshly to the Blue Dot and USICA, stating that they are rooted in a Cold War mentality, and it is an effort to preserve US global hegemony. In response to B3W, China has warned that a few countries could no longer rule the world (Khan 2021). Countermeasures expected from China range from trade war to legislative amendments (Naureen & Waqar 2021).

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
On the contrary, BRI is a global investment initiative that China launched in 2013 to expedite the infrastructure development and economic assimilation of the states along the historic Silk Route; The programme is rooted in policy cooperation, seamless trade, economic assimilation, and interpersonal exchanges (i.e., cultural, academic, and media-oriented). Funding comes from policy banks, state-owned banks, state-owned funds, and international financing institutions (Belt and Road Initiative 2021). “Hard” infrastructure projects primarily include transportation (ports, roads, railways), energy (pipelines, power grids, hydropower dams), and information technology (fiber-optic networks, data centers, satellite constellations). Ongoing “soft” infrastructure projects include special economic zones, free trade agreements, currency swap agreements and reduced tariffs (Rolland 2019). A report on BRI predicted that it would boost global GDP by “over $7 trillion per annum” (Cooper 2019). As of February 2021, 140 countries signed memoranda of understanding with China to join BRI (Barruzi 2021). China invested approximately $755 billion in BRI from 2013 to 2020 (Wang 2021).

The BRI consists of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. It also flexibly and dynamically adapts to and serves different cross-sectional and temporal needs that come up in due course. For instance, in March 2020, China launched a public diplomacy operation and distributed medical aid and supplies worldwide, engaging with foreign embassies and companies working on BRI initiatives; this advanced the Health Silk Road, which had existed since BRI’s inception, but grew in importance during the pandemic. Another example is the Digital Silk Road, initially aiming to enhance recipients’ telecommunications networks, AI capabilities, cloud computing, e-commerce, mobile payment systems, surveillance technology, smart cities, and other high-tech areas. This road primarily caters to the needs of countries in Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia that require low-priced high-quality technology to boost wireless phone networks and broadband internet coverage. Given the pandemic and current high-tech revolution, BRI’s future investments will prioritize health care and digital sectors (Barruzi 2021).

Since 2019, BRI has reduced its lending and now stresses
“high-quality investment,” like employing project finance, risk mitigation tools and green finance (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], 2021). As project costs have grown, resistance has increased in some areas (Chatzky and McBride 2020). Some worry that a more significant Chinese commercial presence worldwide will ultimately result in a more robust military presence; nearly all transport infrastructure being built can also have military use. “If it can carry goods, it can carry troops,” says Jonathan Hillman, director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at CSIS (Kuo & Kommenda 2018). As of 2018, 23 BRI countries were “significantly or highly vulnerable to debt distress”; eight among those were, Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan, and Tajikistan (Hurley, Morris and Portelance 2018).

CPEC and Pakistan-China Ties
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a bilateral Pakistan infrastructure programme, was launched in April 2015. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed 51 agreements and memoranda of understanding worth $46 billion. As part of the more oversized Belt and Road Initiative, CPEC is an opportunity for Pakistan to address its long-standing bottlenecks to sustained economic growth (Rauf 2021). So far, a number of CPEC projects could have been operational. Most of the projects are related to energy, infrastructure development, Special Economic Zones, etc. (Annexure A)

CPEC has played a significant role in Pakistan’s power sector. From 2009 to 2018, Pakistan faced a worsening power shortage crisis, negatively impacting employment, local industry competitiveness, GDP, and exports. Chinese investment was the only window of opportunity to quickly tackle the energy and economy issues.

CPEC has created more than 70,000 direct jobs for residents, contributed one to two percentage points to Pakistan’s GDP growth, established many vocational centers and has announced scholarships. The Health Silk Road helped Pakistan contain COVID-19 by providing COVID-19 testing kits and vaccines (CPEC Official Website 2017).

There are other critical areas of cooperation through CPEC, which include trade, industry, minerals, water resources, land development remediation agriculture, education, etc.

As CPEC expands, Chinese actors incentivize and interact with Pakistani actors in the media, politics, local firms, and education to counter criticism and promote goodwill. To build consensus and gain support from multiple political parties, China has established the Joint Consultative Mechanism (JCM), which unites political representatives from nine different Pakistani parties and the Chinese Communist Party as well as government officials from both countries (Safdar 2021).

The CPEC’s institutional framework is as follows:
Source: CPEC official website
At the same time, there are some CPEC drawbacks. Stalled projects, reports of corruption and China benefiting more than Pakistan have drawn criticism (Sacks 202.121).

Methodology
This study follows the approach focused on engaging with the key stakeholders involved in the policy framework of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The engagement took the form of focus group discussion with representation from different think tanks and departments. The list of participants of the FGD is attached (Annexure B). The participants were asked following questions:
• To stay connected with the global markets, what are the earliest policy shifts required for Pakistan so that alongside CPEC it might get itself adjusted in B3W?
• How can Pakistan leverage from its bilateral ties with G7 countries in order to benefit from B3W projects in the long run?
• How can Pakistan work on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) including SDG-5, 8, 9, and 10 while focusing on CPEC and B3W?
**Analysis**

Based on the above questions, this section presents a comparison between B3W and BRI. The table below highlights key indicators in terms of their importance for BRI and B3W. Besides, the matrix below brings into the discussion the media content analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>B3W</th>
<th>BRI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusivity</td>
<td>Human rights and democratic conditions attached to funding</td>
<td>Inclusive of all countries, no conditions attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Infrastructure deficit/imports infrastructure. Not the same level of technological expertise</td>
<td>Technology and infrastructure excess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Protection</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Corruption</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporating Local Needs</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>Criticized for failure in doing so</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head start</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Already captured promising developing countries, has agreements with 140 countries and enjoys a head start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesive</td>
<td>Bureaucratic decision-making and G7 countries have different stances</td>
<td>Only China heading the initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>No details or timelines of the plan. G7 countries have a bad history of empty promises</td>
<td>Signed agreements with 140 countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Trap</td>
<td>Remains to be seen</td>
<td>Increases debt in countries like Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mistake Allowance</td>
<td>Already controversial colonial image, tight room for mistakes</td>
<td>Positive and impressive image from the start, was the first initiative of its kind so more room for mistakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Primarily soft outcomes (based on their communications so far): health, digital technology and gender equity and equality</td>
<td>Strategic, hard infrastructure: ports, transport, power. Also incorporates health and digital technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Aims to reduce carbon emissions and advance green technologies</td>
<td>Supports green finance, transport, innovation, urbanization, and standards under Green BRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Peace</td>
<td>Promotes harmony</td>
<td>Promotes harmony</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Differences
The G7 would fund and assist labour standardization and work under the ambit of International Labour Organization (ILO) to support labour protection laws and standards. B3W would also spend vast funds to bolster anti-corruption agencies. Both these goals are not specified anywhere under BRI.

Many BRI projects in developing countries, including Pakistan, are criticized and are termed as a ‘Debt Trap.’ Pakistan's economy was facing many challenges even before BRI. CPEC, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has further increased its debt and widened the current-account deficit as Pakistan imported inputs for the projects worth billions of dollars. Eventually, Pakistan had a balance-of-payments crisis and turned to the IMF for a three-year $6.3 billion bailout package. COVID-19 further exacerbated the situation (Sacks 2021). Given China's loans to countries like Pakistan, the trust deficit between them may increase; B3W can effectively learn from this and choose to build a scheme with realistic loans and lending policies (Simon 2021). For now, how these loans will work and the interest rates charged under B3W remain to be seen.

BRI and B3W differ in terms of incorporating local needs. CPEC specifically also face criticism for not prioritizing or including locals. On paper, for instance, Gwadar port has a promising potential, capacity, and future trade value. However, incentives such as competitive handling charges, better cargo port and transport security, expedited customs clearance and free three-month storage have not drawn traders’ attention. Furthermore, although certain aspects of the city may appear better, according to a fisher in the port city, the lack of real advancement stems from the developers “not having the blessings of the people of Gwadar.” The lives of 265,000 residents, primarily poor fishers, are reported to have hardly improved. In some cases, project constructions may have created new challenges. For instance, the construction of an expressway restricted the community’s two kilometers of free access to the sea, negatively impacting their social and economic well-being and causing structural damage to many houses in three settlements. Areas classified as high-security zones prevent farmers from fishing as freely as they used to; this again impacts them economically. Most locals have limited access to necessities such as electricity and education. Slow business and delayed projects are unlikely to improve their living conditions. A resident said people in the area are not against development, but they have been ignored and excluded from decision-making (Ebrahim 2021). On the contrary, B3W promises communities with the long-run benefits, develop strategic partnerships, assess local needs, and consult with communities to increase the depth and expanse of impact (White House 2021).

A contentious assumption about B3W is that all seven countries have the same China policy and would have the same response to Chinese policies. It is simplistic to expect that the US and Japan would have an identical position, especially when the US is in a trade war with China while Japan has a positive relationship (Rizvi 2021). Also, B3W will have to cooperate multilaterally; by default, it would be slower, less efficient, and more bureaucratic (TJMA 2021).

While B3W purports unison, BRI has grown to the extent that it would be challenging to do away with it, even when the competition is with such a powerful group. China has a head start as the BRI was launched in 2013, a long-standing goal of China's Communist Party. Even if we assume that the G7 countries have a cohesive plan, the B3W will fall short in drawing attention of promising developing countries like India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh that BRI has already captured. How many countries will back off the memoranda of understanding they have signed with China just to benefit from the B3W, which at the moment, is little more than political statements? (Rizvi 2021).

BRI is exceptional in its inclusivity: with loose governance and a freehand given to each country's political and social realities, BRI is an open invitation to jump the bandwagon and obtain funding for development without scrutiny and complications. However, B3W has outlined conditions related to human rights, environment, rule of law and corruption prevention, even though the countries they want to target face challenges in all four domains. Why would financially struggling developing countries invest in improving these four B3W conditions when they could easily continue to secure no-strings-attached funding through BRI (Rizvi 2021)?

In B3W, there are no details like countries responsible, capital sources, coordinating mechanisms, international contracting responsibilities, and timelines. B3W seems to be more of a gesture than anything else (TJMA 2021). Generally, the G7 has a history of making empty commitments that are never realized. For instance, all G7 countries are part of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), an association of major OECD donors. They agreed to the UN General Assembly Resolution 2626, which proposes an increase in official development assistance (ODA) to 0.7 per cent of donors’ Gross National Income (GNI). However, G7 member states, including Italy, Japan and the US, contribute less than 0.2 per cent of their national income in foreign aid while France, Canada and the UK are also far beneath the benchmark. Among G7 states, only Germany has achieved 0.7 per cent target. The B3W may be having the same pattern. In contrast, BRI has 140 countries, including Italy, onboard. China's direct investment in these areas totals about $136 billion over the past eight years (French & Dollar 2021).
G7 countries lack excess infrastructure; some of them even face infrastructure deficits. It will not be easy to explain their taxpayers the billions of dollar expenditure in the Global South (TJMA 2021). Similarly, on the one hand, they do not have the technical expertise required for large-scale development and on the other, China’s skills, quickness, and cost-effectiveness in constructing dams, highways, roads, bridges, and railways are widely undeniable (Asia Network 2021). Also, Chinese contracting firms can export excess capacity from China’s infrastructure boom over the last thirty years (TJMA 2021).

B3W will have less room for mistakes than BRI did. BRI was launched in 2013 and appeared to be a new and impressive initiative from a fast-growing country with a positive image. G7 needs to be more careful, given its controversial and colonial past (Ghiretti 2021).

**Similarities and Complementarities**

The supposed rivalry between B3W and BRI may have been given more hype than reality. B3W is a G7 initiative, not solely a US one, which alleviates the risk of a zero-sum mentality. Although B3W has its origin in a Trump administration plan to oppose Chinese influence, the purpose has changed under Biden. G7 countries with less extremist attitudes towards China, like the EU, which has recently negotiated a trade agreement with China, and Italy, a BRI participant, will further shape the idea (Yusuf 2021).

BRI and B3W have shared goals like combating climate change. Both aim to develop green and sustainable infrastructure, reduce pollution, negative environmental externalities, and enhance energy efficiency (Zhu 2021). B3W has mentioned its aims of supporting green technologies and assisting developing countries in reducing carbon emissions (Butt 2021). BRI is moving towards embodying “green BRI.” To this end, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment initiated the BRI International Green Development Coalition to promote international cooperation, incorporate sustainable development into BRI and support green finance and constructions (Wang 2021).

Green Investment Principle (GIP) for BRI includes multiple principles that signatories must incorporate into their strategies and decisions, centered on sustainable corporate governance; understanding sustainability risks; disclosing environmental information; boosting stakeholder communication; adopting green financial instruments and supply chain management; and collective capacity building. The latest 2020 performance report evaluated 23 signatories under such areas. Most signatories have developed and published a sustainability strategy, but they are less advanced in disclosing portfolio information (Wang 2021). The report also establishes a three-year plan, “Vision 2023”, guiding assessment, disclosure, commitment, investment, and growth (Wang 2021).

Another shared objective is regional harmony. B3W may create opportunities for regional integration for Pakistan as both India and Afghanistan will probably partake in projects (Yusuf 2021). Similarly, CPEC may defuse regional tensions by inspiring cooperation, goodwill, and integration. Robust economic and human connectivity facilitate internal peace and stability while curtailing conflict (Rizvi 2015).

Undoubtedly, a discourse on Global South development is incomplete without referring to international assistance as developing countries will require external funding from the industrialized countries to move forward. Even Sustainable Development Goal 17 states that all UN member states must form a global partnership in meeting the SDGs (Ali 2021). Considering China’s overseas development financing dropping, a narrower and more controlled attitude to developing infrastructure abroad and a greater emphasis on quality development (Zhu 2021), especially in the light of the pandemic affecting 20% of projects, countries canceling or reducing commitments and concerns of costs, corruption and eroded sovereignty (Asia has wary welcome 2021), an initiative from G7 offering a timely complementary financial source is welcome, (Zhu 2021), as long as it is less about geopolitical rivalry and more about development (Ali 2021).

Additionally, to build back a better world given the vast infrastructural need in developing countries, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic, B3W and BRI must collaborate. The latter, primarily focuses on traditional hard infrastructure and has vast experience in infrastructure development abroad, either through contracts or foreign aid and also has a comparative advantage in cost and turnover time. In contrast, B3W focuses on softer outcomes related to climate, health, digital technology, and gender equity (Zhu 2021). The rational choice for developing countries like Pakistan is to benefit from both initiatives instead of choosing one (Chaziza 2021).

B3W and BRI can learn from each other. B3W can take insights from BRI’s experience in tackling local challenges in global infrastructure development and from BRI’s trajectory in mobilizing private sector and multilateral agencies in infrastructure development. B3W can mitigate risks BRI faces from the onset like credit risk, macroeconomic risk, legal and regulatory challenges, labour disputes, corruption in partner states, low returns on investment and security risks by ensuring project compliance, transparency, monitoring, and evaluation. Similarly, BRI can sign on to some of the best practices and values highlighted by B3W, like transparency, gender equality and sustainability (Adams 2021).
Political interests may play out in a way that makes B3W and BRI collaboration even more of a realistic possibility. Collaboration is already consistent with how BRI and China operate at large. BRI claims to follow principles of considerable consultation, collective contribution, and mutual benefits. Similarly, China pursues global leadership within a multilateral structure; this is evident in its commitment to globally reducing carbon emissions, tackling poverty and distribution of vaccines (Zhu 2021). Furthermore, as B3W unfolds beyond verbal statements, confrontational dynamics evolving into collaborative strategies may become necessary (Chaziza 2021).

Conclusion
Both BRI and B3W have their separate advantages and disadvantages; some are distinct whereas others are similar. BRI has greater infrastructural and technological capacities, enjoys a head start and has more room for error given its non-controversial past. On the downside, BRI has been accused of sparking increased debt and ignoring local needs in many countries, including Pakistan. On the contrary, B3W supports labour protection and anti-corruption. However, it attaches conditions to funding, has infrastructure deficits and inadequate technical expertise and is likely to face coordination challenges. The G7 also has a history of colonialism and unfulfilled commitments; even the B3W plan does not provide concrete details or accountability. The two also have differing focuses. B3W emphasizes on soft outcomes like health, digital technology, and gender equity whereas BRI has incorporated health and digital technology elements. Instead, it invests more in infrastructure like transport and power.

Still, there is a potential for joint efforts. Both initiatives have shared objectives of sustainability and regional harmony. The supposed rivalry between B3W and BRI will be tempered down by G7 countries with more neutral or friendly stances towards China, i.e, China's principles of multilateral collaboration, development of B3W beyond paper, and possibility of two exchange learning programmes. Most importantly, countries, including Pakistan, need both initiatives to bridge gaps in infrastructure, sustainability, peace and human development, and rights. How a collaboration purely invested in global well-being depends on the policies of the G7, China and rest of the world.

Policy Recommendations
Recommendations for BRI
• Emphasize, ensure, and monitor labour protection, anti-corruption, and gender equity to compete with B3W in soft outcomes.
• Expand Health Silk Road and digital connectivity facilitation to meet the specific needs of a pandemic and post-pandemic world.
• Restructure loans, interest rates and related policies to make it easier and cheaper for low-income and middle-income countries to develop.
• Work with B3W to fill the development and infrastructure gaps and contribute to soft outcomes.

Recommendations for Pakistan
• While working with China on CPEC under BRI, Pakistan should wait for B3W to outline timelines, details, and financing models before finalizing a stance. In this regard, Pakistan needs to:
  • Renegotiate interest and loan terms with China to avoid any debt trap.
  • Widen the framework of public-private dialogue among stakeholders from Pakistan,
  • Develop clear measures to assess the impact of each initiative and its projects in terms of development, sustainability, labour protection, debt, and regional peace.
  • Ensure that policies towards B3W and BRI are driven by interests and reality, not political impulses and emotions and avoid adopting an either-or approach.
  • Reiterate on national and international platforms the importance of maintaining friendly ties with China and at least cordial relations with G7. Also, assert that Pakistan will not be joining a new cold war or any semblance of a cold war, having already suffered immensely and that B3W and BRI must complement and work together in addressing development needs instead of focusing on politics and competition.
  • Leverage pre-existing healthy G7 ties with Japan, Canada, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom to benefit from B3W projects.
  • Match up BRI and B3W projects in areas that those initiatives specialize in, for instance, by allowing CPEC to develop Pakistan's infrastructure while pushing B3W to develop Pakistan's gender equality and social protection safeguards.
  • Avoid duplication and overlap in areas in which both initiatives specialize, like sustainability, health, and digital connectivity; instead, opt whichever is more effective and efficient.
  • Adequately address security issues so that projects remain operational and different countries and institutions remain interested in investing.
  • Invest in research on CPEC and B3W to constantly re-evaluate what would be the best for Pakistan.
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### Annexure A (CPEC Projects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Energy</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Gwadar</th>
<th>Rail Based Mass Transit</th>
<th>Special Economic Zones</th>
<th>Social Sector Development</th>
<th>Western Route</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sahiwal 2x660MW Coal-fired Power Plant, Punjab</td>
<td>KKH Phase II (Thakot-Havelian Section)</td>
<td>Gwadar East-Bay Expressway</td>
<td>Karachi Circular Railways</td>
<td>Rashakai Economic Zone, M-1, Nowshera</td>
<td>People-to-People exchanges and knowledge transfer</td>
<td>Surab-Hoshab (N-85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUBCO Coal Power Project, Hub Balochistan</td>
<td>Expansion and reconstruction of existing Line</td>
<td>Construction of Breakwaters</td>
<td>ICT Model Industrial Zone, Islamabad</td>
<td>Establishment of Consortium of Top Business Schools from Chinese China and Pakistan Side</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engro 2x330MW Thar Coal Power Project</td>
<td>ML-1</td>
<td>Dredging of berthing areas &amp; channels</td>
<td>Inaugurated on 25 October 2020</td>
<td>Industrial Park Pakistan Steel Mills, Port Qasim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Gorges 2nd and 3rd Wind Power Project</td>
<td>Havelian Dry Port (450 M. Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units)</td>
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</table>

**Source:** CPEC official website

### Annexure B (List of Participants)
The table below shows the participants of Focus Group Discussion held on 7 September 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Abid Q. Suleri</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Policy Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Hassan Daud</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Board of Investment and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Hina Aslam</td>
<td>Research fellow</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Policy Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Mustafa Sayed</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Pakistan-China Institute, Islamabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Shafqat Munir</td>
<td>Research Fellow</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Policy Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Talat Shabbir</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>China Study Centre, Institute of Strategic Studies</td>
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