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Politics in Pakistan**

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IN/SECURITY
Afghan Refugees and Politics in Pakistan
Saba Gul Khattak

Abstract

This article highlights the impact of international politics and war upon refugee's lives, asserting that the humanitarian aid that refugees receive is contingent upon interstate and intrastate politics. Indeed, the role of the state becomes contentious as it becomes the source of security as well as insecurity in the lives of refugees. This role is guided by self-interest rather than humanitarian concerns. In the Afghan case, we find that humanitarian aid has sometimes been used to perpetuate endless wars and violence in Afghanistan. This aid was also been used to portray a picture of Afghanistan pivoted on an anti-Soviet struggle through the strengthening of fundamentalist strains in Afghan thinking. The latter affected women and children negatively as different actors within the camps — the Afghan political leadership, donor agencies, and Pakistani administrative structures — manipulated particular images of the ideal family and of the role of women. Women have had to face multiple levels and layers of violence just as men have had to contend with an intensified view of masculinity that naturalizes inflicting violence upon others. Refugees have unnecessarily borne the brunt of the aftermath of regional and international politics, as they have had to contend with both direct and structural violence.

Sultana, a refugee from Tora Bora (where supposedly no one lived), following its bombing in early 2002 said:

Five years after my son's death, my three-year-old daughter died. My mother took me to my parents' house. A weapons depot, near my parents' house, belonging to the Taliban, exploded. I was wounded in the back. My children were at home. My brothers were martyred. They killed my two brothers in Kota Tangi in Kabul by pushing screws into their heads. They had membership cards of Gulbadin's party, so they killed them. Then, five years later, this war started. They dropped bombs on my house at 3:00 AM. I was in the basement with my children. The flesh and severed heads of my husband, five sons, and four daughters were scattered on the ground. I had only this torn veil to gather them in. How can I not wear this veil when I have collected the flesh of my children in it. They arranged seats for my remaining children and me on a bus and sent us across Torkhum into Pakistan. I lost my children alive and dead. I don't know whether or not they got any coffin. I came to Pakistan with my three children. We stayed in a mosque at night. There was no one to help us. Then a woman gave me a room. I was helpless. I had pains in my bones [due to having her feet severed in the bomb attack on her house. After three months, my eight-year-old daughter died. The other one has a chest problem and I can't pay for her treatment. Now, have only one son who became deaf and mentally ill after the bombardment. He is now suffering from epilepsy-like fits. He asks for his father and brothers. He asks me, "Mother, why are we staying here?" He says that we should go back to Afghanistan to join our family. Look at my severed feet and my miserable life. I can't work; I can't wash clothes or earn something for my children. I can do nothing....

One of my daughters died of TB here. Now this one is crying. They say give her fresh food and fruit, but I can't afford these. Now she is very weak and can't even walk. My son is also sick; he suffers from fits and his arms and legs are bent. I can't afford his treatment....

I can't forget my children even if I was crowned as a queen. I can't forget the pieces of their flesh and the bones scattered around. I found the fingers of my innocent daughter.... My children still cry when they remember the flesh of their brothers and sisters..., all of them were around me last year to celebrate Eid but there is no one this year to celebrate. How happy I was and excited last year when everyone was greeting me on Eid day saying, "Mother we wish you Eid Mubarik." But no one is left

this year to wish their mother Eid Mubarak. Not one of my brothers is alive who could say sister, we are here to help you. They left five years before my children. I have lost forty or forty-five relatives during these revolutions. I took part in every revolution in Afghanistan but this one has snatched my home and my country from me....

My daughter was dying and I didn't even have five rupees to buy glucose for her. She died with a small wish to have chicken soup. Now when someone brings chicken soup, it reminds me of her wish.

Introduction

Sultana's story is not new, but it is painful. Her need for security and her longing for a life, which she has *irrevocably* lost, resonate with the longing of numerous Afghan refugees who first came to Pakistan soon after Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in December 1979. They came on foot, on donkeys, and on trucks, through narrow mountain paths, crossing the border, the imaginary Durand line, initially in the hundreds and later in the thousands.¹ They carried their children and their possessions and brought their cattle, escaping bombs, rockets, and gunfire from Russian helicopter gunships. Some bribed their way into security at border checkpoints or in refugee villages. Many thought they had reached their end: security. They were to find that this was merely the beginning of an unending search for security.

The security that the Afghans sought had several facets: physical, religious, cultural, political — in short, they were trying to preserve not only their physical being but also their way of life. When Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in December 1979, they encountered intense resistance,² especially in the rural areas where they were considered to be a godless lot, intent upon imposing a “*kafir*” (atheist) regime upon the people of Afghanistan. As the fighting spread, many left their homes for neighboring countries, mainly Pakistan and Iran.

This article provides a brief assessment of Afghan refugee issues in Pakistan with the object of highlighting the impact of international politics and war upon peoples' lives. It draws heavily on interviews conducted with Afghan refugees between 1996 and 2002, the majority with women, as well as on personal observations on working with women in the refugee camps, and case studies.³ We conclude that for the refugees, structural violence is compounded by their experience of direct violence

The Issue of Refugee Status

“...the story of refugees exposes power politics in its most primitive form... the ruthlessness of major powers, the brutality of nation states, the avarice and prejudice of people.” — Trinh Minh Ha
States are always selective in their support and recognition of refugees not only due to resource scarcity but also because they calculate political advantage in recognizing a particular group of people

1 In the early days, about four hundred Afghans per day entered Pakistan; this number later increased to about one thousand per day and then four thousand per day. Pakistan soon became a refuge for one of the largest refugee populations in the world.

2 Needless to say, this resistance (1979-89) was fueled by American, Saudi, British, Chinese, Egyptian, Kuwaiti, and Iranian money and arms. The official U.S. “aid” figure is \$3 billion, while the combined amount from all countries is estimated at between \$10 billion and \$21 billion (*The Frontier Post*, 22 October 1995).

3 These interviews were conducted for different projects at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), including one entitled “Women, Conflict and Security in South Asia” and another entitled “Rehabilitation of Refugee-affected Areas in Pakistan.”

as refugees. The 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees is the main international instrument that sets the terms and definition of a refugee.⁴ It states:

The term “refugee” shall apply to any person who... owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political option, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.⁵

This definition emphasized persecution by the state for belonging to a particular race, religion, nationality, or belief system. The United States and West European countries were more than willing to extend refugee status to dissidents fleeing the USSR and East European countries because their presence testified to the lack of freedom and other failures in those countries. In turn, the USSR and its allies were not signatories to the Geneva Convention. By the 1980s many were arguing for an expanded definition to acknowledge that refugees, whether from war, environmental degradation, political persecution, or economic causes, are created due to specific anti ill-conceived state policies. They emphasized that the distinction between illegal immigrants and political refugees, which had been made during the cold war, had become meaningless.

Afghan refugees entering Pakistan clearly fit the political definition of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. They were fleeing Soviet occupation during the cold war era. Although Pakistan was not a signatory to the convention or protocol, it extended recognition to Afghans as refugees. Projected as a humanitarian gesture, the underlying motive was the military regime’s (1977-1988) attempt to gain internal and external legitimacy, and to strengthen itself on the military, economic, and diplomatic fronts by taking an anticommunist stance and toeing the American line in its support of the Afghans.

Pakistan was not a signatory to the Geneva Convention or to any other international or regional conventions related to refugees.

The country’s lack of a clearly enunciated refugee policy created problems for both the refugees and the local population. By the late 1980s the cold war was ending and Western countries were no longer keenly interested in aiding Afghan refugees. The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990 following its defeat in Afghanistan, and the fall of the Soviet-backed Najeebullah government in 1992 resulted in waning levels of support. Foreign aid for refugees decreased further when the Taliban took over in Afghanistan in 1996.

The drop in aid meant that thousands of refugees had to fend for themselves in two of the more economically depressed provinces of Pakistan. Following the September 11 attacks, when the Taliban regime was singled out by the Bush administration for harboring terrorists, the Pakistan government sealed its border with Afghanistan and denied refugee status to anyone entering Pakistan. It cited its economic inability to host new refugees, arguing also that Al-Qaida terrorists would likely to cross over into Pakistan. Despite international pressures, especially from UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees), Pakistan remained adamant. Eventually, it allowed 1.5 million people to enter, but refugee campsites were deliberately located in the dry mountainous border areas where refugees were exposed to extreme cold and heat. This drastically different picture, compared to the 1980s when refugees were welcomed, was a product of the changed realities of world politics.

4 This convention, which was limited to Europe and to events preceding January 1951, was later modified by the Protocol on Refugees in 1967.

5 Quoted in Nicholas Xenos, “Refugees: The Modern Political Condition,” in *challenging Boundaries*, ed. Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 265.

Five Waves of Afghan Refugees

Afghans faced foreign military occupation in the years 1979-89 (by the Soviets) and post-2001 (by US-led military forces). Coupled with a continuous civil war since 1980, this foreign domination has cost the lives of an estimated 3 million Afghans, whether in battle or as a result of disease and dislocation in the course of war and internal conflict. Over 6 million Afghans became refugees over the course of the two decades; 3.5 million settled in Pakistan and 2.5 million in Iran. Others went to India and those who could afford went to Europe and North America.⁶

In Pakistan, the majority lived in refugee camps, while the more affluent rented accommodation in the cities. An estimated 3.5 million to 4 million Afghans continue to live as refugees in Pakistan and Iran (late 2002-early 2003). The situation of the refugees is compounded by the fact that many have been repatriated more than once, depending upon the political and economic conditions in Afghanistan as well as the absence or presence of direct violence in a particular area.⁷

Afghan refugees may be classified into different groups based on why they fled and when they entered Pakistan.⁸ The first wave of Afghan refugees came between 1980 and 1992 when Soviet forces occupied Afghanistan and installed pro-Soviet governments; the second wave came when the *mujahideen* took over Kabul in 1992; and the third wave arrived when the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996. From the mid 1990s onwards drought and famine conditions gave rise to a fourth wave of refugees. The fifth and final wave arrived following the U.S-led Allied bombing of Afghanistan in October 2001. The first wave of Afghan refugees — the vast majority of them Pushtun, Afghanistan's largest ethnic group — came from rural areas soon after the Soviet takeover and their numbers steadily increased over the years. A large number were poor peasants, subsistence farmers, small landowners, and clergy. They left their homes and villages largely due to the widespread violence in the countryside where opponents contested the Marxist "reform" policies of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), including land reforms and changes in marriage customs. These reforms, which were denounced as anti-Islam and anti-Pushtun, were accompanied by attacks on village elites (religious and intelligentsia), led to civil war in Afghanistan, and started the refugee flows into Pakistan. With the opposition portraying the war in Afghanistan as a *jihad*, militaristic and intolerant views paraded as "Islamic."

The civil war that erupted after the ouster of the last Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan resulted in an increased exodus. Many who had worked for the communist-backed regime of President Najeebullah sought safety in Pakistan. This second wave of refugees, drawn largely from Afghanistan's business and professional communities, including about twenty thousand Sikhs, many of whom opted to go to India for fear of religious persecution in the camps in Pakistan. Refugees in this second wave, in contrast to the first, were, for the most part, educated people, many with professional degrees, and from well-to-do, urban, Dari/Persian-speaking backgrounds. These refugees had held jobs in the Najeebullah government and its predecessors and they fled to escape the *mujahideen* who perceived them to be Russian collaborators. Like earlier refugees, they also often 'left their homes with little but their clothes. Most were settled in the Nasir Bagh Camp in Peshawar; those who could rent houses in Peshawar and Islamabad settled there. These new refugees were insecure — the older refugees did not trust them and many among them did not trust one another.

6 See appendix 1 (page 14) for figures on refugee numbers over the years.

7 See appendix 2 (page 15) for figures on repatriation over the years.

8 In Pakistan, refugees are also divided into four groups based on their geographical location, i.e., if they had been settled in the North-West Frontier Province or Balochistan, and within these provinces, whether their location is in the north or south, or within the NWFP if they were settled in the tribal areas or settled districts.

The third wave of refugees, fleeing the Taliban regime (1996-2001), consisted of non-Muslim religious minorities and members of Afghanistan's Shia population. The Shias were ethnically differentiated from the predominantly Pushtun Taliban who were largely Sunni. Therefore, the "ethnicization" and "sectarianization" of the conflict that had begun earlier under the mujahideen became more pronounced. The camps' inhabitants became sharply divided along religious and ethnic lines, mirroring the current ethnic and political conflicts within Afghan society.⁹

Incessant fighting in Afghanistan meant that land could no longer be tilled. The absence of rain further exacerbated the situation as crops and orchards dried up. The complete breakdown of state machinery by the mid 1990s meant that the state could no longer ensure food security or provide food aid or health care to rural people. As disease and famine spread, thousands became refugees for a second and even a third time, seeking security in Pakistan. These refugees constitute the fourth wave of refugees.

The fifth wave of refugees consisted of a broad spectrum of Afghans who wished to escape the intense U.S.-led Allied bombing carried out between October 2001 and March 2002 in the war to capture Osama bin Laden and overthrow the Taliban. Many of these "first-time" refugees had lived through two decades of conflict in Afghanistan. However, the intensity of the violence in late 2001 and early 2002 forced them to flee their homes and go to camps elsewhere in Afghanistan or in Pakistan. As soon as the bombing stopped, the majority of these refugees went back or were forcibly sent back to Afghanistan. Once again, because "terrorist threats" and "Afghanistan" became synonymous terms in the popular Western imagination, international aid became available for the refugees, albeit on a much smaller scale than before and for a comparatively short span of time.

Food, Shelter, and Control in the Camps in Pakistan

"When we are hungry, nobody listens, but when we are fighting they send us loads of firearms and artillery. Why?" — Zubaida¹⁰

This section discusses the complex connections between refugee aid and the conflict in Afghanistan at different levels. While aid was effectively used to literally man the war, it was also used for the promotion of conservative ideologies that promoted violence and intolerance with negative repercussions for women and children — a majority of the refugee population.

The Pakistan government determined where the refugee camps would be located and also who was to be settled there. Initially, refugees could only register as refugees in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and in Balochistan, two of the poorer provinces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.¹¹ Registration not only entitled them to shelter in a camp but also to food and material aid such as clothing, shoes, and blankets, as well as access to water, education, and health facilities. Those seeking to register elsewhere in Pakistan could not do so and thus they were not entitled to any direct (individual) or indirect (community) relief or support.¹² The aim was to contain the refugee population in areas believed by the Pakistan authorities to embody "cultural affinity," specifically, between the Afghan and Pakistani Pushtun populations. A problem, of course, was that the Hazaras, Tajiks, and Uzbeks shared neither the same language nor the same culture with the people of the NWFP and

9 Afghanistan is a multiethnic, multilingual state; however, approximately 40 percent of the population is ethnic Pushtun while the rest is Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara. Two main languages, Pushto and Dari, are spoken. The latter is a dialect of Persian and is spoken by the majority of Afghan elite and Kabul residents.

10 Quoted in an Associated Press dispatch, 1998.

11 Later some were permitted to register in adjacent districts of Punjab.

12 Government of Pakistan (GoP), *Handbook on Management of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan*, 1984, vi-vii.

Balochistan. Additionally, settling Pushtuns in Balochistan meant fuelling Baloch Pushtun tensions in that province.

Beyond the ethnicity problem, the refugee flow created economic and environmental pressures in these two poor provinces. But such considerations —relating to the environment, local economy, or ethnicity — were ignored because of the geostrategic importance of these two provinces. It was thought to be advantageous to keep all Afghan refugee campsites in the border provinces, thus Peshawar and, to a lesser extent, Quetta became the headquarters for all Afghanistan-related operations. In this way refugees could be trained and sent back into Afghanistan with the least cost in time or resources.

Refugees in Pakistan initially lived in tents, but with time they built compound walls and mud and brick houses, reflecting their realization that their stay in Pakistan would be a long one. This situation, in turn, meant that the Pakistan government and donor agencies needed to devise systems and programs for refugee settlement and aid distribution. Here, we discuss refugee management in three different contexts: across campsites, within camps, and the connections between refugee status and the Pakistan-based Afghan political parties.

The government of Pakistan set up and managed the administrative system of the refugee villages along lines similar to its own hierarchically structured district administration. For example, the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, through its provincial committees, coordinated programs with donor and UN agencies as well as with the camps. Thus, most of these projects were implemented under the auspices of the Commissionerate in collaboration with provincial line departments, the UNHCR, and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).¹³ This complex structure, connecting the government from the federal to the village level, not only made administering and managing refugees easy but also helped place a web of control over a majority of refugees living in refugee camps. The reporting and control procedures involved not only the creation of the Afghan Refugee Commissionerate with the government but also interlinkages between the different levels of administrators of refugees with provincial home ministries and the interior ministry at the federal level. The latter in turn was in close contact with the ISI, the main military intelligence agency involved in Afghan operations. The ISI was closely associated with the seven Pakistan-based Afghan political parties of the mujahideen, whom it had helped spawn.

At the camp level, provincial line departments in coordination with camp administrators worked with various Afghan appointees — *maliks* (respected figures/leaders) at the camps. The maliks were responsible for the distribution of food and material aid, overseeing community health, water, and education facilities, and acting as spokespersons for their camps. Others took responsibility for the administration of mosques and schools (where they kept a vigilant eye on the curricula and ensured the implementation of *fatwas* — religious decrees. The maliks wielded enormous power over camp refugees' lives in both the material and spiritual contexts. All benefits were channeled through a patronage system that they controlled as persons in charge of the distribution of aid to refugees and with some degree of control over how refugees could interpret and practice religion in their daily lives.

The maliks were all affiliated closely with Afghan political parties. Perhaps this is why several refugees I interviewed complained that the maliks were not from traditionally powerful/influential families (which is what the term “malik” denotes). They were the creations of the Pakistan government. Be that as it may, the point is that refugee support was tied directly to the war to eliminate the Soviet presence in Afghanistan; the system of control within camps was effective because it made everyday survival contingent upon the observation of certain mores. Refugee men could be mobilized to go back to fight in Afghanistan in return for food, shelter, and security for their families.

13 Ibid.. 6 and 98.

Registration was a powerful tool in the hands of the Pakistan government and its foreign supporters. Each refugee household was required to register and declare political allegiance to a *tanzim*- political party as a precondition for eligibility to receive food, shelter, and security.

Refugee Women

Afghan women face threefold levels of discrimination in access to employment and income generation — as migrants, as migrant refugees, and as migrant refugee women in Pakistan. They have had to face the structural impediments that migrant laborers face everywhere: the lowest possible wage rates and limited livelihood opportunities in a depressed wage market. In addition, because of their refugee status and identity as women, they have had to contend with further limitations upon their mobility and access to employment outside the camps. This situation has been compounded by the attitude of policy-makers who perpetuate negative perceptions about women's paid work by making scant efforts to include them in income-generation schemes.

Before the mid 1990s income-generating opportunities for women outside their homes were deliberately restricted by all three agencies involved with managing Afghan refugees: the Pakistan government and its line departments; international NGOs and donor agencies; and the Afghan political parties. For example, the UNHCR funded a ten-year, three-phase, \$87 million Income Generation Project for Refugee Areas (IGPRA)¹⁴ in an effort to mitigate the environmental damage caused by refugees and their cattle to forests and grazing lands in the NWFP and Balochistan. Although the number of women refugees was higher than that of men¹⁵ — and many women needed employment as they became responsible for their family's survival after the loss of male wage earners — they were excluded from IGPRA activities. IGPRA provided employment to Afghan men and in some instances to twelve- and fourteen-year-old boys — on road, canal, and reforestation projects — but none to women. The IGPRA project ignored the poverty/environment nexus in the context of women's vulnerability. Income generation in the context of refugees should have been cognizant of refugee women's desperate need for direct access to an income and should not have assumed such an access through male relatives, who in some cases were either not present or were dead. One can also speculate that identity issues in a foreign land could have been the reason for excluding women from working in reforestation and plantations projects — work that was familiar to rural women in Afghanistan — but the fact is that these issues did not surface where collecting fuel, fodder, and water or grazing cattle were concerned. Thus cultural-identity issues cannot be cited as reasons for the barring of Afghan women from IGPRA projects. Furthermore, income generation for women could have been devised in areas such as carpet weaving.

The IGPRA experience constitutes a clear instance in which foreign donors, Pakistanis, and Afghans colluded in reinforcing the idea of paid work for men alone — an aspect later reflected in the Taliban government's policy of barring women's access to paid work outside the home. The institutions involved accepted the dominant patriarchal values in the camps and made little effort to reach women directly, despite the fact that they preached gender equity. They thus inadvertently reinforced women's invisibility and exclusion from paid work in the public arena.

The denial of access to public sector jobs left women with few survival options. Prostitution among refugee women was not an issue prior to 1992. Coinciding with the cessation of aid and the entry of the second wave of refugees — many without a male family member and with small children —

14 The World Bank in cooperation with the government of Pakistan administered IGPRA.

15 Although official figures place Afghan refugee women at 28 percent of the total refugee population in Pakistan and refugee men at 24 percent, in all probability women constituted a higher percentage because Afghan men were required to go back and fight in Afghanistan, so their presence was not constant.

prostitution began to be reported in the press. Simultaneously, begging among Afghan women and children increased substantially after 1992. According to a Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) report, 30 percent of the prostitutes in NWFP are Afghan women; the report expressed the fear that a large proportion of present Afghan female children would have to adopt the same profession when they grow up. Some of the refugee women talked about the issue candidly, saying that there were very few choices available to women in the absence of male breadwinners.

We have discussed the effects of different policies upon women's lives in the camps. Here, we see some of the ways in which Pakistani government policies structured and reinforced a worldview that enshrined a male-centered and military-rooted power structure in the camps much to the detriment of Afghan women. Afghan refugee women have suffered precisely because of their identity as women, both at the hands of the state and of donor agencies that docilely accepted the Pakistan government's framework for its own programs, and of their own men. Afghan women's rights, including the right to make decisions about their own lives, personal security, education, and employment have been systematically constrained with disastrous effects not only for women but also for children and entire families. Politics within the camps, shaped in the past by male-centered political parties vying for power and among different states seeking to control the camps for their own purposes, have structured and perpetuated this situation.

Conclusion

This article documents the convergence of state, regional, and global politics and military politics in ways that negatively impact refugee lives, most notably those of women. In fact, these politics are part and parcel of a regional dynamic of military conflict that is responsible for the creation of refugees. The humanitarian aid that refugees receive is dependent upon interstate and intrastate politics. Thus far from being humanitarian, it perpetuates both the endless wars that have laid waste the region and the male-centered power structures of the Afghan family, which subordinates and violates women. Aid is contingent on the perpetuation of precisely these structures. When Pakistan extended recognition en masse to Afghans rather than on a case-by-case basis, it projected a compassionate and altruistic image to the world. We have shown, however, that its actions have been motivated by the desire not only to gain international legitimacy, but also to strengthen itself militarily, economically, and diplomatically through its support for a vision of Afghanistan's future that pivoted on an anti-Soviet struggle and the perpetuation of fundamentalist strains in Afghan thinking with respect to women and the family.

The role of the state in simultaneously perpetuating insecurity and providing security in line with its own interests must be underscored. While many refugees are knowledgeable about the role of the state, they seldom make demands upon it. In the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan, refugee women have suffered mentally and psychologically because the refugees' legal status is so dependent upon the whims of the Pakistani government and its support for misogynist forces in Afghanistan. Women's lives have been, disrupted in the deepest possible manner as a result of the multiple violences inflicted on them: on the battlefield, through rape and forced prostitution, and through imbrications in a camp and welfare structure that is predicated on their subordination and disempowerment.

The processes and means through which Pakistan and its supporters pursue their ends in Afghanistan have affected refugees negatively. Refugee men have had to contend with an intensified view of masculinity that involves "permission" to perpetrate and bear violence against other men and women. They have been under pressure to prove themselves as men by constantly risking their lives. Refugee women, whether from rural or urban backgrounds, educated or uneducated, rich or poor — in short, across the board — have suffered in all contexts. They have had to bear physical seclusion,

restrictions on their mobility, the trauma of losing their breadwinners and their children, and of having to situations have been created by state policies and reinforced by the actions of the international communities associated with the UN and various NGOs. In order to unmake them, we need to begin to challenge many of the concepts that inform these policies.

Appendix 1

Afghan Refugee Populations, 1980-2001
(as of 1 January) Date: 10 September 2001

Year	Pakistan (,000)	Iran (,000)	India	Russian Fed.	Kazak -stan	Kyrgy -stan	Tajiki -stan	Turkmen -istan	Uzbek -stan	Total (,000)
1980	400	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600
1981	1,400	500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,900
1982	2,375	800	3,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,178
1983	2,700	1,200	4,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,904
1984	2,800	1,500	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,305
1985	2,900	1,800	6,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,706
1986	2,700	2,000	6,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,706
1987	2,878	2,221	6,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,105
1988	3,156	2,700	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,861
1989	3,255	2,900	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,160
1990	3,272	2,940	8,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,220
1991	3,185	3,00	12,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,197
1992	3,077	2,900	10,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,987
1993	1,627	2,700	11,000	12,000	-	-	-	-	-	4,350
1994	1,477	1,850	24,000	16,000	-	-	-	-	-	3,367
1995	1,053	1,623	22,000	17,000	-	-	-	-	-	2,715
1996	1,200*	1,420	20,000	19,000	2,000	1,000	1,000	2,000	30,000	2,695
1997	1,200*	1,400	19,000	20,000	2,000	1,000	1,000	2,000	30,000	2,675
1998	1,200*	1,400	20,000	17,000	2,000	1,000	2,000	1,000	3,000	2,646
1999	1,200*	1,400	16,100	16,000*	2,100	600	3,600	1,100	1,100	2,646
2000	1,200*	1,326	14,500	100,000*	2,300	700	4,500	1,400	1,000	2,650
2001	2,000*	1,482	12,800	100,000*	2,500	800	15,400	1,500	8,300	3,623

Source: UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)

Note: * From 1996 to 2000, estimates of the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan included all those residing in refugee villages— whether registered or unregistered. Prior to 1996, Pakistan statistics only include registered refugees. Unregistered Afghans living outside refugee villages were excluded from all Pakistan statistics. The figure for 2001 is a government estimate and includes Afghans living outside refugee villages.

* figures for Russian Federation up until 1999 only include asylum-seekers registered with UNHCR. The figures for 2000 and 2001 include asylum-seekers pending temporary asylum and are a UNHCR estimate.

1999 figures for the Central Asian Republics include only recognized Afghan refugees registered by UNHCR or by the relevant government. Asylum-seekers were not included. All figures for the Islamic Republic of Iran are based on government estimates. A very small proportion of Afghan refugees in Iran live in camps. Tens of thousands of Afghan refugees live in countries other than those listed. However, no accurate estimate of their total number exists.

Appendix 2

Afghan Repatriation Statistics

From:	Pakistan (assisted)	Pakistan (spontaneous)	Pakistan Subtotal	Iran (assisted)	Iran (spontaneous)	<i>Iran</i> <i>Subtotal</i>	Grand Total
1988/89		200,000	200,000	-	-	-	200,000
1990	63,000	87,000	150,000	-	-	-	150,000
1991	174,000	26,000	200,000	-	-	-	200,000
1992	1,274,000		1,274,000	7,000	287,000	294,000	1,568,000
1993	133,000	225,000	358,000	337,000	269,000	606,000	964,000
1994	32,000	71,000	103,000	121,000	106,000	227,000	330,000
1995	77,000	76,000	153,000	92,000	103,000	195,000	348,000
1996	101,000	20,000	121,000	8,000	6,000	14,000	135,000
1997	71,000	13,000	84,000	2,000		2,000	87,000
1998	93,000		93,000	14,000		14,000	107,000
1999	92,000		92,000	9,000	152,000	161,000	253,000
2000	77,000		77,000	184,000	31,000	216,000	293,000
Total*	2,187,000	718,000	2,905,000	775,000	954,000	1,730,000	4,635,000

Note: * Some totals may not add up due to rounding

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