

# Analysing Possible Role of USA in Pak- Baloch Conflict

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## 1. Introduction:

Balochistan is a western province of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan and Iran. However, Balochistan and Kalat's (a former princely state within Balochistan) accession to Pakistan after the partition of United India (August 1947) has been questioned by many nationalist groups. The province has special socio-political importance in the domestic context, as it is the largest province of Pakistan in terms of area but is least populated. It is rich on mineral resources. Natural gas that helped the Pakistan's economy turned around was first discovered in this province back in the late 1950's. Still it is the worst food insecure province of Pakistan<sup>1</sup>. The nationalist movements in this province against the federation are quite strong. First military operation was launched in this province in 1948 (soon after Pakistan gained independence from the British Raj). The province is also a known route for drug trafficking, arms and ammunition smuggling, and human trafficking<sup>2</sup>. More recently, the sectarian clashes, target killings of Hazara community and Punjabis, and missing persons phenomena (for which intelligence agencies are being blamed) have created a worsening law and order situation in the province, which demands that a sustainable solution of Baloch issues. The severity of Balochistan's conflict became more prominent on global radar during last decade after the military operation against the chief of Bugti tribe in Balochistan by the then military president General Pervez Musharraf. However, the conflict seems to take a new turn at diplomatic level after the recent exclusive hearing on the issue of Balochistan by the US congress subcommittee members in February 2012.

This research paper attempts to answer the question on the *potential role of USA to act as a third party in the conflict between Balochistan and the central Government of Pakistan*. Narrating briefly about the conflict history, this paper analyses the US position and contribution in the past and present of Pakistan and then based on that analysis tries to foresee whether the USA can emerge as best third party (mediator) in the chosen conflict. In international context, the province is important because it borders with Afghanistan and Iran. It has housed Afghan refugees since the first Afghan war. Quetta, the capital of Balochistan, is known in Western circle for "Quetta *Shoora*" (a faction of Taliban that is allegedly based in Quetta and is supported by some state actors of Pakistan). The US government on record

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<sup>1</sup> SDPI-WFP-SDC (2009), state of Food Insecurity in Pakistan

<sup>2</sup> SDPI-UNODC (2011), Examining the Dimensions, scale and Dynamics of the illegal economy: A study of Pakistan in the Region.

has accused Quetta *Shoora* of fostering militancy in Afghanistan. The province is also one of the hot spots for durable peace in South Asia, as Pakistan blames India for supporting anti federation militants in Balochistan. Iran, which is predominately a Shia majority country, expresses reservation against the target killings of Shias (Hazara community) in Balochistan.

Due to the complexity of the issue and time constraint, analysis of the conflict is limited to two main time periods i.e. USA and Pakistan ties during the Afghanistan war in 1970-1980's and USA's engagement with Pakistan as partner to war against terrorism after 9/11.

## **2. Concept of Third Party in Literature:**

The role of third party to act as mediator in conflict resolution is very well acknowledged in the literature. Bercovitch (2009: 343) has defined the third party mediation as "*a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider to change their perceptions or behaviour, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law*". It is important that the third party should be perceived by the conflicting parties as independent and fair with true intentions to resolve the conflict. Schneckener (2008) defines third party as "*Not a party to the conflict, but an outsider who aims to solve the conflict via fair negotiations and arrangements and not by the victory of one side over the other*".

The construct of third party indicates that depending upon the nature and scale of conflict, various actors, ranging from individuals to an organisation or a state, may act as third party. Third party can opt for various instruments and tools for peacemaking, conflict resolution, peace building and mediation ranging from channelling of information to parties to the provision of incentives and pressure designed to influence the bargaining process. Some argue that third party mediators may have intentions to remain neutral, however they are not always neutral, altruistic 'outsiders', but may have their own aims. Through the act of mediating, they become an actor in conflict relationships and dynamics (GSDRC<sup>3</sup>).

It is interesting to note that at state level, the more potential a conflict has to destabilize the region, the more attention at global level it receives. However, playing third party role in any intrastate conflict at global level is seen as decision of strategic importance and foreign policy matter due to various issues involved on cost, likelihood of success, and legitimacy at local and international level. The success of third party interventions to mediate a conflict is determined by a number of factors, including space and resources given to the process, the

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<sup>3</sup> Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, <http://www.gsdrc.org/index.cfm?objectid=55C2DCE1-14C2-620A-27F372EE5EC5E896> web site visited on April 9, 2012

credibility of facilitator and characters of the negotiating teams and mediators. As cited by Michael (2006), decisions to intervene are a function of the cost and benefit to ‘international reputation, national interest and domestic constraints (Findley G Michael, 2006). [Besides this] Factors associated with intervention include major power status, colonial history, and alliance ties with the civil war country (actor centric), as well as refugee problems and causalities (phenomenon-centric) (Ibid ). Not only these factors leading to the possible interventions are important for transforming a conflict but also the conditions associated with effective use of various instruments are important. Diplomatic versus non diplomatic efforts, Human intervention versus Legal (Adjudication, Arbitration) methods gives a wide range of options to third party theoretically but in real time, it is always much more complex to bring the desirable outcome out of these instruments

### **3. Pakistan –Balochistan Conflict: Historical Background**

To understand the changing faces of the conflict since 1947, it is important to gain an insight of the various events in the course of history. Since 1947 various deprivations and marginalization of Baloch community has led to numerous ongoing conflicts between the federal government and Baloch nationalists on the issues of human right abuses, provincial autonomy, resources distribution, royalty of natural resources, case of missing persons and so on and so forth. Recently, secondary conflicts emerging out of main conflicts are those between the Balochis and non Balochis, and sectarian conflicts where Shias are very often the victims of target killings. The development of the main conflict could be seen under the following significant events.

#### **3.1. Accession to Pakistan (1947-48)**

The history of conflicts in Balochistan dates back to early days of Pakistan, when in 1948 Khan of Kalat, the ruler of one of the four princely states of Balochistan, decided to accede to Pakistan. The brother of Khan of Kalat Prince Karim Khan fled to Afghanistan and launched an armed struggle against this decision. Pakistan Army had to launch an operation to control the insurgents in June 1948. This incident sowed the seeds of mistrust between the federal government (represented by Pakistan Army) and nationalist leaders.

#### **3.2. Discovery of Gas Fields (1952 – Onwards)**

Discovery of natural gas reserves in excess of 10 trillion cubic feet at Sui (Dera Bugti district of Balochistan in 1952) was a great achievement. The gas field area was being controlled by Nawab Akbar Bugti, the head the Bugti tribe. The commercial exploration of gas started in 1954. This was the first major milestone in the country’s energy and petroleum history. Although, these reserves proved to be a blessing for

rest of the country, for Balochistan, they remained a bone of contention for decades to come., Unfortunately, none of the cities of Balochistan were supplied with gas and Quetta, the provincial capital, was the first city in the province to get gas in 1986 when Quetta garrison was supplied with gas. The royalty of gas fields, ambush on law enforcement agencies deployed to protect the gas installations, payment to tribal chiefs for the protection of gas pipelines and non Balochis (both Pakistani and expatriates) are still the seeds of conflict in Balochistan.

### **3.3. One Unit Scheme (1954 – 1970)**

In 1954, the provinces of (the then West) Pakistan, its princely states and tribal areas were merged into one province (called as West Pakistan) as a strategy to counterbalance the numerical domination of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Lahore (the provincial capital of the Punjab, which is currently housing some 69% of country's total population) was declared the capital of West Pakistan. This gave the perception that Punjabis were usurping the rights of smaller (in terms of population) confederating units. This perception still exists and explains the target killing of Punjabis in today's Balochistan.

During the British period, the *Sardars* (Tribal lords) used to be given subsidies as well as full control over internal tribal affairs in return of giving access to British Military to Afghanistan and the control of frontier region (Cheema, 2010). Most of the tribal lords were afraid of loosing their concessions and sovereignty under the One Unit Scheme, so they resented it. However, only a few of them started a violent struggle against the Federal Government. Again a military operation was launched to curb this insurgency. The Federal government established permanent army bases in the "key conflict areas" including Sui gas fields. The fundamental rights were suspended time and again under emergency rule. Mengal, Murri, and Bugti tribes started a guerrilla warfare against Pakistan Army and the federal government. The military convoys were ambushed, and federal government installations, including railway tracks were bombed. The non Balochis, who were appointed either civil servants or technical staff in gas fields, were perceived as the symbol of federal government's hegemony, so they were attacked. There was a greater demand to share revenue generated from gas fields with tribal lords. This insurgency ended in 1969 and the separatists agreed to a ceasefire in 1969. The One Unit scheme was abolished leading to recognition of

the four princely states, the High Commissioners Province, and Gwader as fourth province of West Pakistan (today's Pakistan).

### **3.4. Dismissal of Balochistan Provincial Government and Imposition of Martial Law (1973 – 1977)**

The cessation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971 fuelled separatist movement in Balochistan. Things turned worst when Bhutto Government framing treason charges dissolved the provincial governments of Balochistan and NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and imposed martial law in both the provinces. Some tribal lords formed Balochistan Liberation Front and launched an armed resistance against the Bhutto's military operation. This was the first time Pakistan officially sought Government of Iran's help to curb insurgency in Balochistan. This phase of conflict was cooled down when Gen Ziaul Haq toppled the Bhutto Government in 1977.

### **3.5. Assassination of Akbar Bugti 2006 to date**


In 2006, 79 years old Baloch tribal leader Akbar Bugti got killed in an Army operation. This fuelled a series of agitation and violent protests in major parts of Balochistan. General Parvez Musharraf, the then president of Pakistan, defended his action. In 2008, PPP formed government as a result of general elections. The new government did offer some monetary compensation packages for Balochistan. However, there is no let up in law and order situation over there. Most of the nationalist leaders are being picked up by intelligence agencies without any formal court proceedings.

## **4. Analysing Parties to the conflict**

The following diagram refers to Party A and Party B as the main parties to the conflict. However, these two parties are not working in isolation and have been accumulating support and influence (in the past as well as in the current context) from the various actors and institutions. Some of these actors and institutions have emerged during the first Afghan war, current war on terror, as well as due to foreign intervention in Balochistan. These actors and institutions often maintain their political identity as independent to the claim of Baloch nationalist notion but remain relevant to the analysis of research question as they are associated either to central government, Afghan common ethnicity or sharing anti USA sentiments.



**Figure 1: PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT**



#### **4.1. Party A:**

For the purpose of our analysis, various tribal leaders representing their claim of more autonomous to completely independent Balochistan have been clubbed as Party A. These tribal leaders can be seen as warlords as they have the capacity to aggravate war/conflict within the region and are allegedly helping the militant groups by material or non material supply or resources. During the period of 1970's, Baloch nationalist agenda for full political autonomy of the province came into political discourse as a result of participation of Baloch nationalist leaders in mainstream politics when they took part in provincial and national assembly elections. However, dissolution of Balochistan Government by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ended this window of political engagement. Later, General Ziaul Haq, after toppling the Bhutto regime in 1977, did try to ease the situation in Balochistan by seeking the loyalties of some tribal chiefs.

Depending upon their position, the tribal lords can be classified into three major groups. The first group consists of those who would like to be an ally of the federal government and deny existence of any conflict in Balochistan. The second group comprises those who would like to take part in political process and recognise the federal government but raise their note of dissent for Balochistan's cause (read as greater provincial autonomy). The third group includes those who would boycott any engagement with the federal government and like to opt for violent or non violent measures for complete independence.

Like tribal leaders, the political parties in Balochistan can also be divided into three categories-Baloch Nationalist Parties, Pashtun Nationalist parties and mainstream political parties which either have religious or political orientation (Cheema, 2010). Nationalists demand more autonomy while religious mainstream parties have more inclination towards military for their own vested interests. However, the mainstream political parties have a goal to expand their representation by engaging middle class and immigrant population in the region. So even in the assembly, divergent interest of political parties' clashes and most of the time, the aim of developing the region is sabotaged by personal agenda of these parties.

This is one of the reasons that no federal government could engage itself with the Baloch leadership on the question of greater autonomy or recognition of right of local groups on local natural resources (especially the gas field). The task of the federal government turned even more difficult (and is still so) as it can never find a single

representative of Balochis with whom a political dialogue may be carried out. None of the Baloch tribal leaders can claim to have the mandate to negotiate on behalf of the people of Balochistan.

This led to the use of armed forces as the only tool to suppress any insurgency or voice for the right of self-determination in Balochistan (Alok, 2006), which in turn gave rise to more insurgent groups. Main insurgent groups operating in the region include Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Movement (BLM), Baloch Resistance Army (BRA), Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Bugti Tigers and Baloch National Army (BNA). These groups have been a support to and influence the Baloch separatist movement.

#### **4.2. Party B:**

The second direct party to the conflict is the central government of Pakistan which has been seen as unjustifiable party in the conflict and till recently was perceived to generate structural violence in the region of Balochistan through unjust distribution of National Finance Commission award<sup>4</sup>. Pakistan is a democracy in the making. Repeated martial laws have weakened the civilian institutions and army has a final say in defence and foreign affairs. Even at times the democratically elected governments have to rely on military establishment to ensure the writ of state. This phenomenon has turned military and paramilitary forces as an ally of the central government whereas nationalists in Balochistan do consider Army as an active party to the conflict.

Balochistan's geo-strategic location is perceived to be extremely significant for Pakistan's physical security. The government keeps on raising the issue of insurgents seeking help from Afghanistan (either from the government or from the Afghan based Taliban), and also accuses India of supporting them (through Afghanistan). There are reports that Iran is involved in supporting Shia groups and different middle eastern governments (especially the anti-Iranian) are allegedly supporting the Sunni groups.. Pakistani intelligence agencies have also reported the presence of undercover CIA agents, and private detective agencies funded by the US government (such as black

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<sup>4</sup> Most of the revenues till now (before 18<sup>th</sup> Amendments of the constitution) were collected by the central government and then redistributed between federal and provincial government under National Finance commission award. Size of the population had been the only criteria for this allocation of resources among provinces and since Balochistan occupy the lowest population among other province, the funds released had been lowest until the recent NFC award announced in Dec 2009.

water) in Balochistan. It is difficult to collect evidences for the above-mentioned undercover operations and then present them to a court of law. This is the main argument that intelligence agencies use to defend their position in “missing persons” case where agencies pick the people and investigate them, often abusing basic human rights, without providing them any opportunity to defend. In a constitutional petition filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in March 2007, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) submitted a verified list of 148 missing persons, the overwhelming majority from Balochistan and asserted that law enforcement and intelligences agencies were responsible (Internatioanl Crisis Group, 2007).

The missing persons case is under trial in the Supreme Court of Pakistan and is a sub judice matter, so cannot be discussed in detail . However, the point here is the role of intelligence agencies, which have turned themselves into a party to the conflict against Baloch nationalists too.

Another important group that is placed in “Party B” category for our discussion purpose is the tribal leaders who joined mainstream political parties and are perceived by hardcore nationalist groups as those betraying the cause of autonomous Balochistan.

The conflict between Balochistan and the central government can be analyzed as asymmetric conflict. The literature available on the asymmetrical conflict tells us that in such conflicts both the parties to conflict strive to retain or gain power (Ramsbotham Oliver, 2005). It is evident from the previous section that Baloch nationalists have been striving for greater autonomy, control on provincial natural resources, and an end to their perceived exploitation from central government. The federal government instead of addressing the structural issues has been trying to address the Baloch conflict through the use of military force. Gillani government did try to address the situation by pouring in development funds to every member of the provincial assembly, but, this technique did not work much to bring peace at mirco level.

## **5. Potential Third Party?**

The success of third party intervention in chronic conflicts and reported human rights violation situation such as that of Balochistan are well documented in the literature of conflict resolution and mediation. It is evident from various conflicts in the world that absence of *effective peace constituencies* from within the central government or state institutions

demands for third party intervention. In case of Balochistan, since one party is unwilling to acknowledge the conflict, there is a need for the third party intervention in Balochistan conflict. However, the question is that who would be that third party? Can USA as super power play an effective third party role to resolve this conflict? If it can, then which tools it can possibly use to mediate this conflict? In order to answer some of these questions, it is important to understand and analyse the role the USA has played in the region and to assess how USA is being perceived by the conflicting parties in Balochistan issue.

### **5.1. The USA role: Present and Past in Pakistan**

The USA is never perceived as a friend in time by most of the Pakistanis. The books “Friends not Masters” by General Ayub Khan, “In the Line of Fire by General Parvez Musharraf”, and “Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West” by Benazir Bhutto give a detailed account of their view on the USA’s inconsistent policy towards Pakistan. According to all three of them, the relationship between Pakistan and the US has never been based on mutual trust.

Pakistan and The USA came closer in 1950, when the first Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan visited The USA ignoring the invitation from USSR. First Military President General Ayub Khan played an important role in establishing US-China diplomatic relations. However, to Ayub Khan’s disappointment American military aid never arrived during 1965. Likewise, much awaited American marine aid never reached in 1971 when Pakistan lost its battle in East Pakistan. After the first nuclear test by India in 1974, the USA realized the danger of destabilizing the region and pressurized Pakistan to abandon its nuclear program. However, within less than a decade, it reinstated its relationship with Pakistan to get the latter’s support to wage a war against Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The USA fought this proxy war through CIA-funded mujahideen, who were provided safe sanctuaries in Pakistan by the Zia regime. After the Soviet war was over, certain sanctions and economic embargos were imposed by the USA on Pakistan due to the Congress pressure in 1990 but they were limited in scope and number. During 1996 and 1997, many incentives were provided to Pakistan by the USA without any reciprocal non-proliferation concessions. In 1998, after the nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan (which were followed by the tests by India), the USA again imposed certain economic embargos on Pakistan (Samina, 2000). After September 11 tragedy, Pakistan was asked to be an ally of US forces or face the wrath of it. Pakistan opted to be a NATO ally and initiated operations against

militant groups which had connections in Afghanistan (including those based in Balochistan).

One of the debates during 2008 US presidential elections was whether the global war on terror a successful strategy or a mere rhetoric. While antiwar sentiments in the USA were growing, the USA Government was demanding of Pakistan to do more in this war. The USA's excessive emphasis on a military solution to the terrorist problem in Pakistan and neglect of democratic process eroded political support for the regime of President Pervez Musharraf (Jones Bruce & Stephen, 2009).

Since 2004, series of drone attacks in Pakistan's Federally Administrated Tribal Areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province against the alleged "high profile targets – members of Taliban, Al Qaida" by US Air force resulted not only in huge civilian damage but also in provoking public sentiments against the US government. Official statements from Pakistani authorities against the drone attacks went unnoticed in Washington.

The level of trust between Pakistan and the US turned to the lowest in 2011. Killing of two Pakistani citizens by an alleged CIA agent Raymond Davis in Lahore in January 2011, capture and killing of Osama Bin Laden by US Marines apparently without the permission of Pakistani authorities in May 2011, and American airstrikes on Salala checkpoint (during November 2011 in North Western part of Pakistan) killing 28 Pakistani soldiers were exploited both by the opposition parties as well as anti American groups in Pakistan to mobilise public against the USA. On the other hand, presence of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan provided USA a solid ground to accuse military of supporting extremists. To them, this is sufficient ground to carry out drone attacks in Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistani political forces took US Mariners' operation as attack on sovereignty of Pakistan.

Suspension of supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan through Pakistani land routes after the Salala incidence, and parliamentary resolution to suspend supplies till US authorities formally apologise over Salala and undertake not to carry out drone attacks is yet another manifestation that trust building between Pakistan and the USA would take longer than expected.

## **5.2. Can USA leverage itself as Mediator?**

In the light of above discussion, the recent exclusive hearing by US Congress subcommittee members on the issue of Balochistan did very little for Baloch nationalists' cause. While this hearing was perceived as a moral victory by the

Baloch separatist groups, Pakistani officials as well as mainstream political parties including opposition has seriously condemned such initiatives declaring it interference in the internal matters of Pakistan<sup>5</sup>.

It is quite clear that the US government does not enjoy trust based relations either with the Government of Pakistan, Armed Forces, or with the mainstream political opposition parties. Pakistan's religious parties, due to their direct or indirect support for Pakistani Taliban, are against the US government. The survivors of drone attacks are against the US forces due to their collateral damage. Most of the Shia groups having sympathies for Iranian government are against the US policies due to its stance against Iran.

Most of the US interventions in Pakistan and its neighbouring countries have been seen as a struggle for power rather to bring the global peace. Anti American sentiments in Pakistan will not easily accept the US role in dealing with any issue related to self-determination right of Balochistan.. On the other hand, US role as super power and third party in the conflict of Balochistan may have legitimacy for some Balochi groups but not for other evolving actors in the region.

Hypothetically speaking even if the US were to be a third party mediator, the trust deficit between both the parties of conflict is also critical to determine the likelihood of mediation outcome. Both the democratic and military regimes had been in a state of denial on the issue of Balochistan for a long period of time. It is only recently when PPP government announced Aghaz-e-Haqooq Balochistan package<sup>6</sup> (beginning of recognition of rights of Balochi people package). But, the prolonged nature of conflict and trust deficit in central government has blocked the process of acceptance of any diplomatic resolution at this moment. On top of it, the military presence in Balochistan region and missing persons issue are the hurdles in way of political dialogue. Thus USA cannot expect both the parties to sit on the table to negotiate at USA's initiative or presence.

On the other hand, USA can also not opt for any coercive strategy to fight the central government of Pakistan on the issue of Balochistan. There is a likelihood that

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<sup>5</sup>A Pakistan Embassy spokesman in Washington said that Pakistan's Ambassador Sherry Rehman raised the issue of an exclusive hearing on Balochistan by US House Committee on Foreign Affairs in her meetings with the members of congress and senior officials of the US administration. The express Tribune February 10,2012

<sup>6</sup> The government of Pakistan announced on 24<sup>th</sup> Nov,2009 ,Aghaz-e-Huqook Balochistan Package promise to contains several initiative to bring Baloch people in mainstream. However, Baloch leaders found the package is much more below their expectations and also objected that the true stakeholders were not consulted in this proposed package .

uninvited third party mediation will not bring peace but can destabilize the whole region. However, economic support or its absence (or even economic sanctions) can be the only “stick and carrot” approach for the US for bringing peace in the region. However, any such sanctions can provide an excuse to the civilian and military leadership of Pakistan to stop any support against their war on terror.

## **6. Conclusion:**

Looking at the current regional situation and Pak-US relationship, we can say for sure that USA cannot be the third party to resolve Balochistan issue. Any involvement of USA would further hurt the cause of peace in Balochistan as the US involvement would be perceived as a support to insurgents by Pakistani government (Party B). Theoretically speaking, the regional peace can be restored through a superpower or third actor intervention, if it tries to change either capabilities or intentions of both the parties involved in the conflict. Nevertheless, there are conditions attached to any region subject to conflict to employ peace strategies successfully. These conditions include the presence of superpower as hegemonic power in the region, regional coherent states [which can foster conflict resolution] and domestic level where liberal democracies can play their part in the region of conflict are three conditions helpful in bringing regional peace (Benjamin, 2005).

When we analyse these conditions with respect to Balochistan, the US has never been present there as hegemonic power in the region. In fact, the US involvement in the region has kept on changing and so is its policies towards this region. The idea of regional coherent states also gets marred due to lack of trust among the three key players, Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran, and between the two nuclear neighbours, Pakistan-India. The third condition at domestic level is also not supported by democracy, as unfortunately the liberal democracy is also held hostage to various tribal lords in Balochistan. (In Balochistan Assembly, there is only one opposition member because all the independent members joined the provincial cabinet).

The security dilemma within Balochistan, cannot allow the US to take any action with force as the conflict will gain trigger from one border to another immediately (see Annexure B). If at all USA wants to use other instruments to intervene, it needs to have integrated support at larger scale from the countries neighbouring Pakistan. But, without the full support of other neighbouring states, any step taken by USA to intervene in the conflict will not be perceived as a just and fair effort.



Annexure 1 :

Summary of important incidents and period in the conflict:

Year	Events	Impact
1948	Pakistan Army invasion to suppress the revolt in Kalat.	Prince Karim was forced to take refuge in Afghanistan.
1953	Discovery of Natural Gas At Sui in Balochistan.	The interest of central government and federal elites to explore more natural resource potential in the province and have more centralised autonomy over Balochistan region.
1955	Under one unit policy, various states of Balochistan were dissolved and merged with West Pakistan.	Rise of Baloch nationalism as one unit policy was taken as a threat and an effort to eliminate ethnic and linguistic identity of Baloch.
1960	Military action by central government to suppress uprising led by Nawab Nauroz khan Zarakzai.	More solidarity among Baloch population and grievance against central government
1964	Supply of natural gas to major cities of Pakistan started but not made available to Balochistan due to low population density and high cost of supply in this region.	Led to more exclusion of this region and local community by depriving them from the social services made available to rest of the region of the country.
1970	The first general elections in 1970 leading to victory for the nationalist in the National and provincial assembly and signing of the constitution by Ghuas Baks Bizenjo.	The first major conflict that led to armed insurgency was started in 1972, when the National Awami Party after winning the elections formed the provincial government and started raising the issue of state rights, especially share from economic benefits accruing from the natural gas.
1973	Dismissal of Nationalist government by Bhutto charging the provisional government with lawlessness and collusion of Baloch separatist with foreign government for the separation of Balochh and Pastun territories.	The insurgency started in 1972 lingered till 1977 and more than 5,000 insurgents and over 3,300 soldiers were killed.
1977	Zia Ul Haq general amnesty for political prisoners. Some leaders went into exile.	This led to involvement of cross borders support through illegal means for the separatist form Afghanistan border.

1977-88	General election, the Baloch nationalists got together and formed the Balochistan National Alliance (BNA) led by Nawab Akber Bugti.	Nationalist remained struggling with Pakistan People Party in the National assembly as the PPP had majority
1999	Military coup led by General Pervaiz Musharraf started a state of violent conflict .A full fledged military operation started in Dera Bugti.	At least 48,000 people were displaced due to conflict from District Bugti and Kohlu alone. According to UNICEF internal assessment , over 80 percent of deaths among those surveyed were among children under five.
2005-2008	Serious insurgencies challenge to the writ of the Government and subsequently more military operations in the region	Killing of Tribal leader (Akber Bugti ) in August 2006 raised more hatred against Pakistan as it was a matter of tribal resistance and tribal honour
2009	New elected government changed the formula of NFC award and added other variables to allocate resources to the province. Haqooqe Balochistan Package introduced as providing relief to the province	Situation improved slightly for the funds allocation overall but still it was not addressing various core issues like cases of missing persons, presence of high military force in the province and demand for political autonomy for natural resource usage.

Source used for the construction of this table:

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Annexure 2:

Figure 1. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Border and Frontier Area



SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, 2007.

Secondary Source: (Johnson.H Thomas and Mason M, 2008)

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