Owing to its predominantly agricultural economy, arid soils and inadequate precipitation, Pakistan is critically dependent on the waters of the Indus River Basin to irrigate its lands.
Pakistan has also utilised the Indus Basin’s waters for hydropower generation. That is why access to the Indus Basin’s flows has been recognised as an essential imperative for Pakistan’s water and overall national security.
With crucial technical support from the World Bank, India and Pakistan negotiated between 1952 and 1960 on sharing the waters of the Indus River Basin, culminating in the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) on September 19, 1960. The IWT defined the rights and obligations of India and Pakistan concerning the water assets of the Indus Basin.
India’s illegal suspension of the IWT (which it described as ‘holding the treaty in abeyance’) in April 2025 has imperilled Pakistan’s water and overall national security. Pakistan has described the suspension of the IWT and the several measures initiated by India concerning the western rivers that would reduce their flows into Pakistan. Islamabad has rightly described these violations of the IWT as the “weaponisation of water” and demanded the treaty’s restoration.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his Independence Day speech from the Red Fort in Delhi on March 15, 2025 declared that “blood and water cannot flow at the same time”. He called the Indus Waters Treaty "unjust and one-sided", as it had led to “the waters of the rivers originating in India to irrigate the fields of the enemy, while our soils and our farmers remained parched”. Modi declared that, henceforth, the water that belongs to India will be used exclusively for India and Indian farmers. Belgian author and journalist Gie Goris has noted that between mid-August 2025 and the beginning of summer 2026, Modi repeated his anti-Pakistan rhetoric at least 80 times in his public meetings!
Contrary to Modi’s claim, the IWT conceded India’s unreasonable demand for complete control over the three eastern rivers, which irrigate 80 per cent of Pakistan’s cultivated lands. It also allows India to use the waters of the three western rivers allocated to Pakistan for producing electricity before they enter Pakistan. Since 1974, India has built 34 hydropower plants on the western rivers, mainly the Jhelum and Chenab, with a total capacity of 3,500MW.
The IWT has been universally acclaimed as an appropriate template for water-sharing agreements, especially between riparian states having adversarial relations. A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson described the treaty as “the gold standard in terms of water-sharing agreements”. The treaty survived two major India- Pakistan wars and numerous skirmishes along their long and contested border. The treaty’s elaborate dispute settlement mechanism was envied in South Asia and applauded in other developing countries.
The IWT’s provisions inspired several principles of international water law, such as reasonable and equitable sharing of benefits; amicable resolution of differences and disputes; the No Harm Principle; and prior informed consent, which were subsequently enshrined in the 1997 UN Watercourse Convention.
India launched its assault on the IWT on January 25, 2023, by demanding intergovernmental negotiations for a new water-sharing agreement. India cited demographic changes, climate change effects and the need to produce renewable energy to justify its call for new negotiations. It disregarded Pakistan’s suggestions that its concerns should be taken up by the Permanent Indus Commission. In August 2024, India announced the suspension of the Indus Commission, rendering the treaty dysfunctional.
On April 23, 2025, following a terrorist attack in Occupied Kashmir, for which it blamed Pakistan, India announced a slew of measures, including the “holding of the IWT in abeyance until Pakistan abjures its support for cross- border terrorism”, and ending all contacts and cooperation with Pakistan. India-Pakistan relations touched the proverbial rock bottom. A couple of weeks later, India launched air attacks on multiple targets. Pakistan’s counterattack shot down India’s prestigious Rafale fighter aircraft before a ceasefire came into effect.
India stopped providing information and data on water flows in the western rivers, violating Article 6 of the IWT and creating serious difficulties for Pakistan’s flood management during the monsoons. It also hastily approved eight large hydropower projects, with a total capacity to produce over 5000MW electricity, on the Chenab. Indian media reported plans to expand the Ranbir Canal, built in 1903 and recognised by the IWT, to increase the quantity of water drawn from the Chenab, reducing the flows into Pakistan, and to build an underwater tunnel to carry water from the Chenab Basin to the River Beas Basin.
All these projects would drastically reduce the amount of water in the Chenab, which irrigates over a million acres of land producing large quantities of both rice and wheat.
Pakistan’s telemetry readings indicate declining flows from across the border. Since infrastructural projects take a long period to materialise, the full impact of Indian measures will take some time to be felt. In the interim, the most serious effect is widespread uncertainty in Pakistan over the inflow of vital river water.
To be continued
The writer is a retired ambassador and former UN assistant secretary-general.
© 2026 SDPI. All Rights Reserved Designed and developed by NKMIS WEB Unit